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ABSTRACT
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
Raj Navanit Patel
Cristina Bicchieri
Why are some countries wealthier than others? Recent scholarship on this question has begun to
converge on the answer to this question: institutions. Some countries are wealthier than others,
on this view, because they have the right institutions. These are a set of well-functioning
institutions that allow individuals in society to cooperate and coordinate with each other, and, in
the end, secure the welfare gains from that cooperation and coordination.
Institutions matter, in other words. But which institutions? In this dissertation, I argue that it is
the presence of particular informal institutions (such as social norms) in some societies, and their
absence in others, that ultimately decides whether cooperation and coordination is achieved, and
welfare gains are secured. I argue that the historical focus on formal institutions (such as formal
laws and regulations) is somewhat misplaced, since whether or not people abide by formal
institutions is determined by the presence of particular informal rules and norms that govern
everyday interaction. In a nutshell: formal institutions matter, but informal institutions rule.
In Chapter 1, Institutions, development, and corruption: the Clientelist Trap, I provide a “macrolevel” view of the role that informal institutions play in generating welfare-relevant outcomes in
development contexts. Specifically, I argue, following Douglas North, that institutions play a
critical role lowering transaction costs and facilitate cooperation. Lower transaction costs allow
for advanced, specialized economic markets that ultimately generate wealth. I then develop a neoinstitutionalist account of corruption and apply it to corrupt political markets, specifically, to
clientelist politics. I sketch a model that shows the conditions under which clientelism is a stable
political strategy for both corrupt patrons (elite politicians) and their clients (non-elite voters).
In Chapter 2, Institutions out of thin air? A classical liberal case against charter cities, I turn to a
“meso-level” view of institutions in a development context. If institutions are so central to
development, why not create discrete political units—charter cities—to compete with places that
have “bad institutions”? Proponents of charter cities make this argument and claim that building
a place like Singapore on the coast of a place like Somalia is the solution to a number of
development problems (such as corruption). In this Chapter, I argue against charter cities from a
broadly classical liberal view. Specifically, I claim that there are reasons to think that charter
cities are not a morally justifiable form of government by the classical liberal’s lights, even if some
form of the charter city (i.e., a private city) is an ideal form of libertarian government. I also claim
that much of the pro-charter city arguments rest on a set of empirical claims that fuel pragmatic
considerations, but these empirical claims are either false or they actually give us reason to
question the very workability of charter cities.
In Chapter 3, The natural and the social in the metrics of justice, I turn to a “micro-level” view of
the role that institutions play in mediating individual differences in a way that is relevant for
liberal egalitarian theories of justice. Specifically, I turn my attention to the debate about the
status of so-called “natural inequalities” between Rawlsian resourcists and capability theorists. I
argue that capability theorists are able to accept both that distributions of natural endowments
are neither just nor unjust while also maintaining that a theory of justice’s metric ought to be
sensitive to individual variation (even when this variation has, at bottom, a “natural” (innate,
biological) component). This is because capability theorists are able to adopt a more sophisticated
understanding of the natural/social distinction, one that stresses the interaction between the two
through the mediating role of both formal and informal institutions. What lies at the heart of this
understanding is a particular conceptualization of the nature of disability, namely, the interaction
model.
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5. Conclusion
1. Introduction
How does Nigeria “get” to Denmark?1 That is to ask, how does a society characterized by low
honesty and high corruption transform itself into a society characterized by high honesty and low
corruption? This is the central question of anti-corruption policy, and indeed, the central question
of development policy generally. Remarkably, after at least two decades of research and billions of
dollars disbursed, we still do not have a satisfactory answer. Anti-corruption success stories are
few and far between, and in many cases, countries that have received billions of dollars from the
international community for anti-corruption political reform have higher levels of corruption
than before they pursued those reforms. It is not much of an exaggeration, then, to say that two
decades of anti-corruption policy has been a failure.
Why have these efforts failed? One increasingly influential answer to this question places
the blame squarely on the theoretical underpinnings of these efforts, namely, the
conceptualization of corruption as a principal-agent problem.2 The idea here is that an honest
principal (e.g., a public body) contracts with an agent (e.g., a politician or a bureaucrat) who then
abuses their public power for personal gain. The key assumptions are that the agent’s interests (in
a utility-maximizing sense) diverge from the principal’s interests, and that there is an information
asymmetry between the principal and the agent. What determines whether the agent will engage

To use Fukuyama’s turn of phrase: “The international community would like to turn Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and
Haiti into idealized places like ‘Denmark,’ but it doesn’t have the slightest idea of how to bring this about.” The problem of
development, according to Fukuyama, is the problem of “getting to Denmark,” where Denmark is a generic stand-in for an
“imagined society that is prosperous, democratic, secure, and well governed, and experiences low levels of corruption”
(Fukuyama 2014, p. 26).
2 Persson et al. (2013, 2019); Rothstein (2005, 2018); Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, 2013, 2019).
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in corruption is the cost and benefit of the action: if the benefits of engaging in corruption
outweigh the costs, then the agent will engage in corruption. On a particular theoretical
understanding of this view, preferences are non-social and exogenous (i.e., the model assumes
agents will maximize self-interest independently of what other agents do) and the analytic focus is
on formal institutions (the legal rules, penal sanctions, and so on) as opposed to informal
institutions (norms, expectations, and so on); the kind of anti-corruption reforms that flow from
this framework aim at increasing the costs of engaging in corruption through formal rules and
mechanisms, such as increased monitoring and punishment.
But in cases of systemic corruption, corrupt behaviour is not the result of an independent
and individual preference to maximize self-interest in the face of formal rules. Instead, in many
cases, the best way to understand corruption is as a behaviour supported by a set of shared beliefs
and expectations, where social preferences to engage in behaviour are dependent on the expected
and actual actions of others. The underlying thought here is that the costs of engaging in
corruption are high if one expects nobody else to engage in corruption, but the costs of not
engaging in corruption are high if one expects everybody else to engage in corruption. From this
view, preferences are endogenous, and the key analytic focus is on both the formal institutions as
well as the informal institutions that drive the practice. The bottom line is that anti-corruption
policy must be sensitive to both the formal and informal sets of rules that structure the incentives
to engage or not engage in corruption, as well as the interaction of these formal and informal
rules. The broader theoretical current behind this approach is best described as rational choice
neo-institutionalism.3
A point that is often lost in the more polemic arguments against the principal-agent
approach to corruption is the idea that principal-agent models are, of course, naturally
compatible with a broader collective action approach. Principal-agent relationships are almost
definitionally integral to the analysis of corruption since the most basic understanding of
corruption involves the misuse of public power for private gain—a relationship that implicates a
principal-agent relationship at its very core. The arguments in this dissertation align with this
general sentiment. Instead of aiming to displace principal-agent approaches to corruption, I show
that a sophisticated understanding of corrupt behaviour implicates both principal-agent theory
and collective action theory, and indeed, the two approaches are complimentary.
In this chapter, I develop and defend a rational choice neo-institutional account that
specifies the kind of informal institutions that drive corrupt practices.4 In §2, I clarify the

I take the rational choice neo-institutionalist intellectual lineage to stretch back at least to Adam Smith, and to be firmly
a part of what Boettke, Haefelle-Balch, and Storr (2016) refer to as ‘mainline economics,’ which accepts the idea that
‘formal and informal institutions guide and direct human activity’ as a key premise (p. 4). For more contemporary
exemplars of neo-institutionalist thought, especially with respect to political and economic development, see North (1981,
1987, 1990, 1991, 2005); North, Wallis and Weingast (2010); Ostrom (1990, 2000, 2005, 2009, 2010, 2014); Acemoglu,
Johnson & Robinson (2001); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, 2019).
4 The account in this chapter also informs and underpins the theoretical and empirical understanding of institutions in the
rest of the dissertation.
3
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empirical and theoretical connections between the account and economic and political
development, with a special emphasis on the mediating role institutions play through transaction
costs and trust. In §3, I apply my general theoretical account to political clientelism. Here, I
provide my own definition of clientelism, one that requires us to look at the formal and informal
institutions that structure the political relationships that characterize clientelist politics (which
are, of course, ubiquitous in developing societies). In §4, I provide a theoretical model of
clientelism that I call the “Clientelist Trap.” The Clientelist Trap draws attention to a set of
circumstances whereby a clientelist equilibrium stabilizes as an efficient political strategy because
of voter preferences for clientelism. I argue that voters prefer clientelism because it is often the
most attractive option in their option set, given credibility and commitment problems that plague
other, more seemingly better options. I briefly present fieldwork evidence from Nigeria to provide
empirical content to my theoretical framework (see Appendix 1).5 As I argue in §3 and §4, the
Clientelist Trap is a theoretical and empirical application of the general neo-institutionalist
account developed in the chapter, and it is one that helps us make sense of some of the central
empirical puzzles that animate much of the rational choice literature on political clientelism. In
§5, I conclude.
2. Collective action theory and corruption: a theoretical overview
a. Institutions, development, and transaction costs
Neo-institutionalism rests on the idea that the pursuit of individual self-interest, under the
appropriate institutional framework, generates net social benefits to society as a whole. It is the
existence of these institutions in some societies and not in others that provides the dominant
explanation of patterns of comparative development; in other words, the differences in prosperity
between societies seen around the world today is best explained, in the final analysis, with
reference to the sorts of institutions that one finds in those societies. The diagnosis of developing
societies and the problem of development in general is thus framed, on this view, in terms of a
lack of an appropriate institutional framework that aligns individual self-interest with the
interests of the broader society in which those individuals live. The difficulty in securing the right
institutional framework for any society is that a state that has the capacity to deliver even on the
most basic institutions (i.e., to provide a minimum of law and order, property rights,
enforcements of other contracts, and so on) is also a state strong enough to predate on the efforts
of its citizens. “Getting to Denmark,” then, really means getting to a strong, competent state that
is sufficiently constrained so as to not interfere with the security of property and other underlying
market-relevant institutions.

I note also that the general theoretical account I develop in this chapter compliments fieldwork I have undertaken and
published elsewhere (Patel and Hoffman, 2017).
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The “right” institutions align private self-interest and social benefit and thus leave
everyone better off; thus we would expect a demand for the right institutions. Almost all
individuals in the developing world would prefer to live in a society with the right institutions, i.e.,
those under which honesty was rewarded and dishonesty was punished and where one could be
reasonably confident that others would generally act honestly. But a well-functioning society that
provides the preconditions of prosperity is, on this view, the ultimate public good and thus suffers
from the same problems that afflict the provision of any public good. Individuals stand to benefit
from the provision of a well-functioning society without having to contribute to it in the same way
they stand to benefit from any other public good without having to contribute to it. And thus the
ultimate public good of a successful society that facilitates cooperation is predictably
underprovided.6 Developing societies thus face a second-order collective action problem with
respect to the supply of institutions; it is precisely the inability to overcome this collective action
problem that explains the pervasive market failures that cause welfare losses associated with
those societies.7
At the theoretical core of neo-institutionalism as it relates to corruption is an
understanding of institutions.8 There are two important, related approaches to mention here.
First, the institutions-as-rules approach, elucidated in a body of work beginning with Douglas
North and Elinor Ostrom,9 views institutions-as-rules, where institutions are considered to be the
“rules of the game in a society.”10 Formal rules, such as laws and legal regulations, are
conscientiously decided upon by the relevant political community, and the extent to which these
rules can be designed so as to minimize transaction costs is to the extent to which the “Smithian
result” of productive markets will obtain. Both North and Ostrom provide a hierarchy of rules,
such as operational rules that govern the day-to-day, collective-choice rules which determine
operational rules, constitutional rules which determine collective-choice rules, and metaconstitutional rules which determine constitutional rules, and at the very top, the rules of the
biophysical world—rules that are beyond human design.
Much of the institutions-as-rules literature focuses on conscious political rule choice; if
individuals are not satisfied with the rules governing interactions on one level of the hierarchy,
they “move up” the levels to change rules at the higher level. But there is no reason to think choice
of rules will be efficient or beneficial for everyone or even a majority, since the set of rules that
“ultimately emerges will depend on the perceived interests of actors involved in setting the
rules.”11 In most cases, these interests will be the those of the powerful who are able to set, and
crucially, enforce the rules. These interests will often diverge from the general interest, even if

Keefer (2018, p. 10).
Bates (1988); Ostrom (1990).
8 For a general overview, see Greif & Kingston (2011) and Hindriks & Guala (2015).
9 North (1981, 1987, 1990, 1991, 2005); North, Wallis and Weingast (2010); Ostrom (1990, 2000, 2005, 2009, 2010,
2014).
10 North (1991).
11 Avner & Greif (2011, p. 16).
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more efficient rules would leave everyone better off. Thus, institutional rule-choice is plagued by a
dual commitment and credibility problem, where powerful elite interests cannot commit to nonabuse of power for their own private interests, and other, less powerful groups cannot commit to
compensating the powerful for the loss of power that would come along with more efficient
institutions. This is an insight that stretches back to Adam Smith, who explained the persistence
of inefficient institutions such as slavery in exactly these terms.12 The commitment and credibility
problems that plague developing societies is an issue that I return to in §4.
The second, related strand of literature on institutions focuses on institutions-asequilibria.13 Where the institutions-as-rules approach emphasizes institutional choice,
institutions-as-equilibria emphasizes an underlying theory of motivation which generates
equilibrium-stabilization pressures that result in particular behavioral regularities. From this
view, what induces behavior is not the overarching formal rules given by the state, but rather
social expectations on what others do, are expected to do, and what others expect us to do
(empirical and normative expectations in Bicchieri’s terminology).14 Behavioral regularities are
often best thought of as stabilized through informal institutions, in these terms, for there are
often an attendant set of “invisible,” informal rules that motivate individuals to comply with a
behavioral rule or bear the costs of deviating from that rule. Since deviation is costly relative to
compliance, these informal rules generate an equilibrium that is the result of a “structure that
motivates each individual to follow a regularity of behaviour in that social situation and to act in a
manner contributing to the perpetuation of that structure.”15 The problem of corruption from the
institutions-as-equilibria view is not the absence or presence of formal anti-corruption rules, but
rather the self-sustaining presence or absence of particular informal rules and the behavioral
regularities they give rise to.16 It is the presence self-sustaining of “bad” informal rules, i.e., rules
that make honesty costly relative to dishonesty, that forms the core of the collective action
problem at the heart of the problem of development.
I note here that these two approaches are often framed as in tension with each other
despite some recent unificationist accounts.17 I do not aim to settle the debate here. Suffice to say
that the two approaches complement each other given that institutions-as-rules focuses on
institutional choice, and institution-as-equilibria focuses on the theory of motivation that
generates stabilization pressures that reproduce institutions. More importantly, both approaches
point to an influential line of critique of the principal-agent approach to corruption which holds
that the problem with the principal-agent view is that it focuses on the individual when the
problem is often institutional (or systemic). Diagnosing corruption, on this view, requires us to
use the theoretical tools of neo-institutionalism and collective action theory rather than principalFor a good overview on Smith’s arguments on the persistence of inefficient institutions, see Weingast (2016).
Avner & Greif (2011, p. 25).
14 Bicchieri (2006).
15 Avner & Greif (2011, p. 25).
16 Ibid.
17 Hindriks & Guala (2015).
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agent theory alone, since endemic corruption is best viewed a “malicious” equilibrium sustained
by interdependency of beliefs about whether others will engage in corruption. Collective action
theory, in other words, focuses on the institutions which structure interactions between the
principals and the agents—both formal and informal.
b. Transaction costs and trust
While the “post-Washington Consensus”18 view amongst the development community (and the
underlying social sciences) has come to accept the core neo-institutionalist claim that it is the
institutions of a society that will determine its overall economic growth, the fundamental
emphasis on institutions is not at all new. Indeed, the idea that the relevant institutions are
necessary for the functioning of markets, and crucially for the coordination and efficiency gains of
markets to obtain (with their attendant welfare benefits), stretches back to at least Adam Smith.
In the notes of lectures written some 21 years before the publication of Wealth of Nations (1776),
Smith wrote that “little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the
lowest barbarism, but peace, and a tolerable administration of justice.”19 Obtaining the “Smithian
result,” to use North’s turn of phrase, requires the appropriate formal and informal institutions.20
The social sciences—most remarkably economics—seems to have forgotten this basic
insight as neoclassical economic theory, with its emphasis on technical analysis, rose to enjoy
status as academic orthodoxy from the 1930s onwards.21 Indeed, institutions do not feature at all
in neoclassical economics (embodied in welfare economics and the Arrow-Debreu general
equilibrium models) because of a set of assumptions that the standard models make about the
framework in which economic exchange takes place. As Boettke puts it, the “formalistic rendering
of economic reasoning in the 1930 –1960s strove to be institutionally antiseptic” (his
emphasis).22 Crucially, the models assumed what Weingast has dubbed “the neoclassical fallacy,”
which is the view that (1) agents performing economic transactions enjoy perfect security; (2) a
system of well-defined property rights with complete contract enforcement exists; and that (3)
there is no arbitrary state (or any other actor with a monopoly on violence) to predate on
productive economic exchanges.23 In other words, neoclassical economics assumes that the
transaction costs involved in economic exchange are zero.
Transaction costs are crucially dependent on the institutional framework in which they
accrue. This insight comes from Coase’s seminal work in which he “opened the black box”24 of the
firm and asked why they exist as a form of governing hierarchy in market settings. His answer:

Burki & Perry (1998).
Smith (1976).
20 North (2005, p. 80).
21 Boettke (2018).
22 Ibid., (p. 161).
23 Weingast (2016, p. 192).
24 Coase (1937, 1960); Hodgson (2005).
18
19
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Since the costs of finding potential trading partners, communicating with them, negotiating
contracts, monitoring performance and ensuring enforcement are lower in a single hierarchical
organization than they would be in a decentralized market setting, economic actors organize
themselves in ways that lower these costs and thus allow them to realize higher economic gains
from economic exchange. Following this literature, I define transaction costs as the sum of
coordination costs (i.e., the costs involved in search, communication, negotiation, and
monitoring) and transaction risks (i.e., the costs involved in enforcement including losses
incurred due to non-enforcement):
Transaction costs = coordination costs + transaction risks.25
A subset of transaction costs is closely related to the problem of trust.26 These are generally the
costs involved in transaction risks. Transaction risks become a problem for modern complex
economies that are characterized by a division of labor and the attendant high levels of
productivity and economic growth because trade is often conducted amongst strangers as
opposed to close kin or family. These economies usually feature transactions that are governed by
impersonal rules of exchange where there is a time lapse between when a promise is made and
when it is executed.
These transactions have the structure of a one-sided prisoner’s dilemma (or a Trust
Game). One sided prisoner’s dilemmas are games where the payoff structures for the players are
asymmetric: Player A (trustor) has the option to cooperate (to invest or not invest). If Player A
cooperates (invests), player B (trustee) has the option to cooperate (not exploit) or not cooperate
(exploit). Player A’s optimal choice is to not invest, and Player B’s optimal strategy is to exploit.
The result is a suboptimal Nash equilibrium that is Pareto-inferior where the gains from mutually
beneficial exchange go unrealized.27 This is one way to think about the effects of high transaction
costs in a given economy: Player A’s “fear” of being exploited by Player B (and the associated
social losses) represent a social dilemma; high transaction costs represent the costs of overcoming
that social dilemma in any given economy.28
This Trust Game indicates the importance of generalized trust in resolving the social
dilemma that Player A and Player B find themselves in. Generalized trust is the trust that
individuals have in anonymous others or in impersonal formal institutions. How would trust
emerge in such a situation such that Player A and Player B can realize mutual gains? Consider
games that allow for long-term repeated interactions between two players (Repeated Trust
Games). These games are structured to study the effects of “dyadic embeddedness,” which allow
for two mechanisms through which trustfulness and trustworthiness can be induced: Player A can
Clements et al. (1993).
Beccerra & Gupta (1999).
27 Greif (1994, p. 918).
28 Buskens (1998, 2002); Buskens & Raub (2002, 2013).
25

26
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learn (from the past behaviour of Player B) and control (by withholding trust in the case that
Player B decides to exploit during the games).29 The experimental results from these games
provide a somewhat intuitive result: Player A’s decision to trust is largely conditional on whether
Player B has decided to not exploit in previous iterations of the game.30 With a long enough timehorizon, Player B has incentives to build a reputation in order to secure investments from Player
A.31
A further variant of Repeated Trust Games provides Player A information about Player
B’s interactions with other trustors. These games are structured to study the effects of “network
embeddedness.”32 Games of this sort will typically provide Player A with a reputation score about
Player B as well as allow for Player A to provide feedback (which in turn will have an effect on
Player B’s reputation score). The general experimental findings show that network embeddedness
tends to promote trustfulness and trustworthiness.33 Interestingly, a recent study found that the
size of the effect is stronger when embeddedness is chosen endogenously (i.e., players in the game
invest in an information mechanism that provides a reputation score or its equivalent) than when
it is provided exogenously.34 These experimental findings provide clues for mechanisms behind
the purported links between social capital and economic growth. Many of the specific risks facing
any given individual (or firm) stem from information asymmetries between the parties to the
transaction. These generally result in adverse selection problems before the execution
(precontractual opportunism) and principal-agent problems after the execution (postcontractual
opportunism).
Consider an example of a simple bilateral employment contractual relationship.
Contractual relationships between employers and employees typically involve information
asymmetries of the following sort. Potential employees know their abilities to perform on a
particular job better than potential employers do. Moreover, employees know more about their
performance on the job than their employers do. Firms thus face transaction risks from potential
employees misrepresenting their abilities (precontractual opportunism as an adverse selection
problem) or shirking while on the job (postcontractual opportunism as a moral hazard problem).
Firms are generally aware of such risks and tend to invest resources to minimize their exposure
(such as screening mechanisms to shield against precontractual opportunism and monitoring
mechanisms to shield against postcontractual opportunism).
The particular attributes of the good or service at the heart of the transaction might add a
further level of transaction risk (and thus attenuation cost). For example, consider the ‘lock-in

Buskens & Raub (2002).
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31 Ibid.
32 Buskens & Raub (2013).
33 Ibid.
34 Frey et al. (2019). Note that the choice to invest in an information mechanism that promotes embeddedness in this
context is a voluntary contribution toward a public good (since the information mechanism promotes trustfulness and
trustworthiness which benefits all).
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effect,’ which refers to a contractual arrangement where one party to the contract has more of an
interest in its eventual realization than the other. The lock-in effect is related to the ‘hold up
problem,’ which refers to the possibility for opportunistic behaviour created by the asymmetry of
interests between the contracting parties. Contracts involving highly “transaction-specific” assets
will be particularly susceptible to lock-in effects and hold up problems because asset specificity
usually means the asset’s value is tied up to the particular firm or transaction.35 An example of
this would be an employee who learns firm-dependent skills, as in the case of an employee who
learns how to code software in a language that is used exclusively by a particular firm or a law
associate who has specific knowledge of a particular client with a set of idiosyncratic legal issues.
Contractual mechanisms to mitigate the risks of opportunism that flow from the lock-in effect
include collective bargaining arrangements (e.g., labor unions) or mixed-ownership structures
(e.g., law firms).
When generalized trust is low, transaction costs are high because contracting parties
must take steps to shield themselves from heightened risks of defection. Low trust societies must
divert resources into risk minimization that might be freed up and directed toward more
productive uses in a high trust environment. In already resource constrained environments, high
transaction costs due to low generalized trust may prohibit markets from developing, producing
failures of cooperation and higher costs for collective action. This is one reason why developing
societies conspicuously lack sophisticated, advanced markets that require high levels of trust
(such as primary and secondary insurance markets). It is precisely the lack of such integral
markets that leaves individuals in the developing world, especially the poor, in a fragile and
precarious position, often one small setback away from financial ruin.36
Moreover, societies with low generalized trust allow for economic markets that rely on
high levels of particularized trust. Indeed, societies with endemic corruption often have high
levels of particularized trust, since iterated corrupt transactions rely upon informal rules such as
reciprocity, loyalty, and honesty to emerge and structure trust specific to particular others. This
also generates demand for intermediaries (“middlemen”) to ensure that individuals aiming to
contract with corrupt individuals will find the “honestly dishonest” party they are looking for.37
These intermediaries are often individuals placed within a network of trust who have information
of where honestly dishonest individuals may find and contract with each other.38 As the number
of corrupt market participants increases, specialization occurs through “investments in know-how
and networks” that produces “positive feedback loops” signaling to others that corruption is both
cheap and profitable, and carries low risk of sanction.39 High transaction costs for legitimate
contracts also allows for arbitrage opportunities, where, e.g., frontline bureaucrats can raise and
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lower transaction costs to perform functions that should be free or outside of their legitimate
discretion.40 In other words, individuals with power—whether on a large (grand) or small (petty)
scale—create islands of low transaction costs to secure selective cooperation and collective action,
at the expense of the welfare interests of society at large.
Finally, societies with low generalized trust tend to generate political markets that rely on
high levels of particularized trust. These are political arrangements characterized by clientelistic
non-programmatic politics,41 where political elites (patrons) or their representatives (brokers)
selectively target particular voters (clients) or their representatives (brokers) with inducements
aimed at securing the targeted voters’ political support or raising the probability of securing their
political support. I turn now to a more thorough discussion of clientelism.
3. Clientelism and vote markets
a. Clientelism: a definition
Clientelism is notoriously hard to define. Since clientelist relationships are socially embedded in a
matrix of informal institutions that structure political and economic life, conceptually delineating
between different practices is a key task for scholars investigating distributive politics in the
developing world. Moreover, the characteristics of a clientelistic change are prone to ambiguity –
sometimes intentionally so – which makes conceptual clarity even more difficult. As Nichter put
it: “[S]tudies of clientelism often report survey or fieldwork evidence about the relative prevalence
of clientelist vote buying, but it is sometimes unclear what specific attributes of benefits are
considered.”42
Despite this “conceptual diversity,” there does seem to be broad agreement on two
features that are in most, if not all, accounts: (1) the contingency requirement, which is that
clients view inducements as conditional on some action or obligation (political support) on their
part; and (2) the iterative requirement, which is that clientelist exchanges are not one-shot
encounters, but interactions where all parties hold the mutual expectations to the effect that
transactions will continue into the future.43 With these requirements in mind, I define clientelism
as follows:
Clientelism describes governance arrangements where political elites (patrons) or their
representatives (brokers) selectively target particular voters (clients) or their
representatives (brokers) with inducements aimed at securing the targeted voters’
political support or raising the probability of securing their political support.
Ibid.
I contrast clientelist non-programmatic politics with non-clientelist programmatic politics.
42 Nichter (2014).
43 Hicken & Nathan (2019).
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Inducements are (1) iterative, (2) distributed in accordance with informal and nontransparent rules or discretion, and (3) may be positive or negative.
Positive inducement here refers to offers of benefits broadly construed in exchange for
electoral support. Positive inducements are distributed by the informal discretion of the
political elite, even if what is being distributed privately is in fact public. An example of a
positive inducement would be offering a prospective voter a job in order to secure their
political support.
Negative inducement here refers to sanctions broadly construed (e.g., the principal
threatens the agent with violence to elicit a particular voting outcome) in exchange for
electoral support. Negative inducements are imposed by the informal discretion of the
political elite, even if the resources or institutions involved are public. An example of a
negative inducement would be withholding a welfare entitlement to a prospective voter in
order to secure their political support.
My definition aims to capture a central feature of clientelism which is often overlooked, namely,
the distinction between positive and negative inducements. This distinction is crucial to
understanding vote markets because of three reasons: (1) it allows us to capture a set of
unobservable characteristics that structure all vote market transactions and will, in some cases, be
essential in explaining or predicting whether a successful transaction is achieved; (2) a natural
taxonomy flows from it, providing a richer picture of the possible repertoire of electoral strategies
available to the patron, allowing an investigation into the circumstances under which particular
mix will be employed (see Table 1). This is important as a matter of public policy, especially since
negative inducement includes violence at its extreme, and reduction in electoral violence is a clear
and important public policy goal; and finally (3) it captures a set of essential differences between
markets in which violence is routinely (and successfully) employed strategically and those in
which it is not, which has implications for a number of nearby contemporary debates on (a) the
moral permissibility of legalized vote markets,44 and (b) whether corruption is “efficient” and a
“Political Coase Theorem” exists.45
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Strategies aim to…

Increase the number
of votes for a
particular candidate

Increase voter
turnout

Decrease voter
turnout

Types of inducement
Positive inducements
Type (A)
Positive inducements in the
form of benefits (broadly
construed) are distributed in a
way that is targeted (at
particular voters), contingent
(upon electoral support), subject
to non-public and nontransparent rules of
distribution, and temporally
specific (i.e., offered close to
actual elections). For example,
offering direct cash for
individual voters to vote for a
particular candidate.

Negative inducements
Type (D)
Negative inducements in the
form of threatened or actual
sanctions (broadly construed) in
a way that is targeted (at
particular voters), contingent
(aimed at eliciting electoral
support), and temporally
specific (i.e., offered close to
actual elections). For example,
threatening individual voters
with violence to induce them to
vote for a particular candidate.

Type (B)
Positive inducements in the
form of benefits (broadly
construed) are distributed in a
way that is targeted (at
particular voters), contingent
(upon showing up to the polls
on election day), subject to nonpublic and non-transparent
rules of distribution, and
temporally specific (i.e., offered
close to actual elections). For
example, offering direct cash for
individual voters to turn up to
the polls on election day
(without stipulating who to vote
for).

Type (E)
Negative inducements in the
form of threatened or actual
sanctions (broadly construed) in
a way that is targeted (at
particular voters), contingent
(aimed at increasing voter
turnout), and temporally
specific (i.e., offered close to
actual elections). For example,
threatening individual voters
with violence to induce them to
turn up to the polls on election
day (without stipulating who to
vote for).

Type (C)
Positive inducements in the
form of benefits (broadly
construed) are distributed in a
way that is targeted (at
particular voters), contingent
(upon not showing up to the
polls on election day), subject to
non-public and non-transparent
rules of distribution, and
temporally specific (i.e., offered
close to actual elections). For
example, offering direct cash for
individual voters to not turn up
to the polls.

Type (F)
Negative inducements in the
form of threatened or actual
sanctions (broadly construed) in
a way that is targeted (at
particular voters), contingent
(aimed at decreasing voter
turnout), and temporally
specific (i.e., offered close to
actual elections). For example,
threatening individual voters
with violence to induce them not
turn up to the polls on election
day.

Table 1. Categories of electoral clientelism.

If, for example, withholding a benefit is more likely to induce the required behavior than offering
it because of asymmetry in the ways in which voters might perceive the costs and benefits of a
thing taken away against its being offered, then knowing whether the voter holds expectations for
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that good is critical as well.46 This is primarily due to the fact that individuals tend to perceive
gains and losses asymmetrically.47 This implies that behaviour—in terms of whether inducements
are successful and cooperation is achieved—may critically depend on whether inducements are
perceived as gains (positive) or losses (negative).
Whether an inducement is considered positive or negative might depend on nonobservable features of the particular situation, such as highly localized norms of reciprocity that
structure a set of underlying beliefs and expectations on the part of the voter. Consider an
example of a politician who offers a potential voter a job in the bureaucracy in exchange for
electoral support. If the voter expects the job, threatening to withhold the job would be a negative
inducement. If the voter does not expect the job, offering the job would be a positive inducement.
It’s entirely plausible that politician’s offer will elicit a different response from a voter who was
expecting the job against one who was not—if, for example, the perceived net loss in utility from
the withheld benefit is enough to secure cooperation in the former but the perceived net gain from
receiving the benefit is not enough to secure cooperation in the latter.48 The fact that the two cases
are indistinguishable in terms of the observable features of the situation underscores the claim
that the underlying beliefs and expectations are integral to understanding the practice.
b. Vote markets beyond the principal-agent problem
Much of the quantitative rational choice literature on clientelism is centered around a principalagent problem at the heart of the informal agreement (vote contract) between patron (buyer) and
seller (client) in illicit vote markets under conditions where ballot secrecy is maintained.49 One
core element of clientelist exchange is that the quid pro quo: some good is targeted at particular
votes in a way that all parties understand as conditional upon the execution of some obligation
typically tied to political support. In the case of vote markets, the targeted benefit is exchanged for
votes. Patrons as buyers in vote markets face substantially high transaction costs because rules
that safeguard ballot secrecy ensure non-simultaneity of exchange and prohibitively high
monitoring costs, placing them in a principal-agent problem: it’s easy for voters to “take the
money and run” since they benefit from the exchange before they discharge their obligation which
are done in secret anyway. Patrons must solve the principal-agent problem for clientelism to be
an efficient political strategy. On the assumption that resolving the commitment problem is
required to make clientelism an efficient political strategy, the existence of vote markets suggests
that the patrons succeed in holding voter-sellers “perversely accountable,”50 and thus overcoming

On the distinction between positive and negative inducements, and its implications, see Mares & Young (2016, 2018,
2019); Justesen & Mares (2019).
47 Kirstin et al. (2011).
48 Mares & Young (2016).
49 The typical case of clientelism is where the patron is a member of the political elite or its representative who contracts
with a client who is typically a member of the vulnerable poor through a broker who serves as an intermediary.
50 Stokes (2005).
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the information asymmetries inherent in vote market transactions. Thus, one of the central
puzzles of scholarship on clientelism asks how clientelism is an efficient political strategy in light
of the commitment problem.
A particularly popular line of research in responding to this puzzle emphasizes the
distributive choices patrons make when distributing clientelist goods, with the assumption that
patrons will target specific groups to help them overcome the commitment problem. This
research is motivated in large part by a gap between a widely held theoretical intuition and a
counter-intuitive empirical finding. The theoretical intuition, formalized in a seminal article by
Susan Stokes is the expectation that patrons should target voters with weak political preferences
in order to maximize electoral chances, since those with strong political preferences will vote
favorably without inducement (party loyalists) or will be insensitive to positive inducement
(opposition loyalists).51 The empirical finding is that most clientelist transfers are in fact targeted
as party loyalists, raising a second central puzzle that animates scholarship on clientelism: why do
patrons target their own loyalists for clientelist goods?
An unfortunate consequence of the emphasis on the commitment problem is that
insufficient attention has been paid to the supply side of the interaction, namely, the beliefs,
expectations, and motivations of the vote-seller. Instead, much of the analysis of remains fixed on
the patron’s strategy in terms of distributive choices in relation to the commitment problem. As
some scholars have recently noted,52 what seems to be driving on the focus on the commitment
problem is the assumption that it binds in every transaction and its “solution” is always
monitoring. It is worth considering the theoretical conditions that are taken to be constitutive of
the orthodox view of vote market transactions:
1.

Clientelist transfers involve non-simultaneous exchange of a contingent benefit.

2. Non-simultaneity and contingency entails that all transfers occur under conditions of
asymmetric information.
Note that (1) and (2) are equivalent to the conditions under which a principal-agent problem may
arise. Now consider the following three conditions, which I take to be false:
3. The commitment problem is a constitutive feature of all vote market transactions.
4. The commitment problem “binds” parties with patron as principal and client as
agent.
5. The solution to the commitment problem is monitoring compliance.
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Conditions (3), (4), and (5) go further and claim that a principal-agent problem does arise and is
solved in a very specific way. It is these last three claims, (3), (4), and (5), motivate the
widespread view that clientelism is a feasible electoral strategy only when the commitment
problem is overcome, meaning that a vote-buying equilibrium emerges only when monitoring and
enforcement is successful, defection is deterred, and transactions are complete.53 This line of
reasoning motivates the centrality of the principal-agent problem and provides a rationale for the
tendency to privilege the patron’s perspective.
The rationale fails on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Conditions (1) and (2) hold
insofar as they can be read as a recognition that information asymmetries are “built into” the
transaction in light of (a) the non-simultaneity of exchange and (b) the contingent nature of the
benefit. These properties are fixed to the exchange and their presence will generate information
asymmetries between buyer and seller along with the potential for ensuing agency problems. But
conditions (3), (4), and (5) need not be true, since there are no theoretical reasons to assume that
conditions which provide ripe grounds for agency problems will in every case produce them.
Moreover, there are a number of empirical studies documenting what look very much like
clientelist exchange – with an iterated and contingent quid pro quo – without the subsequent
monitoring and enforcement activities that we would expect if the commitment problem truly did
bind in all cases.54 In other words, the rationale fails on the ground that it mistakes the conditions
under which a principal-agent problem might arise with the actual existence of a principal-agent
problem in every case.
The implication is that clientelism looks like a feasible electoral strategy without the need
for complete transactions, and so without the need for post-contractual monitoring. This raises a
new puzzle: How it is possible for a clientelist equilibrium to persist without post-contractual
monitoring and enforcement? Clientelist transfers represent significant expenditures in resourcescarce environments, often involve intermediaries (such as brokers), and require substantial
organizational capacity. Without monitoring and enforcement, the substantial room for
opportunism suggests high opportunity costs for vote buying relative to other possible electoral
strategies. Yet a mounting body of evidence suggests that “clientelism-without-monitoring” is
widespread, raising significant questions about the central assumptions of the discipline. I now
briefly sketch a model that illustrates the conditions under which clientelism-without-monitoring
becomes a viable strategy.
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4. The Clientelist Trap: contracting for votes
a.

Why not programmatic politics?

To understand how and why clientelism-without-monitoring is a viable political strategy for
corrupt politicians, it is first necessary to consider the political options faced by potential voters in
societies where political corruption is endemic:
Option set 1: the ideal programmatic set
(a) A preference for programmatic politics.
Vote out dishonest candidates and instead vote for an honest candidate through
formal political channels.
(b) A preference for collective action politics.
Coordinate and act collectively with other potential voters to create their own
institutions.
(c) A preference for clientelism.
Sell their vote and engage in informal, non-programmatic politics.
(d) A preference for nothing.
Remain politically powerless or leave the polity.
A reasonable assumption would be that most voter preferences run (a) > (b) > (c) > (d). That is,
most voters would prefer standard programmatic politics where honest politicians deliver public
goods in a transparent and accountable fashion. Short of that, voters would prefer to create their
own institutions and parties that deliver public goods in a transparent and accountable way. If
these two options are not available, then voters would prefer clientelist politics, where political
power is viewed as private power and public resources are distributed in accordance with
informal and non-transparent rules and elite discretion. And lastly, the worst option of all (from
the voter point of view), would be to refrain from the political system altogether through political
non-participation or exit.
But this is not the actual option set faced by voters. Rather, it is a highly idealized version
of it. Once we include costs associated with exercising each preference, it becomes clear that the
real option set consists solely of (c) and (d), i.e., the real choice is between clientelism or nothing.
So the “real,” non-idealized option set is actually:
Option set 2: the clientelist dilemma
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(c) A preference for clientelism.
Sell their vote and engage in informal, non-programmatic politics.

(d) A preference for nothing.
Remain politically powerless or leave the polity.
The upshot is that clientelism emerges as the most attractive option even if the voter’s preference
ordering is (a) > (b) > (c) > (d):
(a) A preference for programmatic politics. We would expect almost everyone to have a
preference for programmatic politics characterized by a political system where distributive rules
are fair and transparent so as to ensure fair delivery of a wide range of public goods. There are
three reasons why this is not a viable choice in societies where corruption is endemic.
First, when corruption is widespread, potential candidates face a credibility problem. As
the standard principal agent model above suggests, politicians qua agents often have wide
discretion after being elected because of prohibitively high monitoring costs faced by citizens qua
principals. If a conflict of interest exists, which it does in the case that a politician pursues their
own self-interest over the public interest, then standard moral hazard agency issues ensue.
Second, public resources that political offices give individuals or parties access to often
raise a common pool problem because everyone who has access expects others with access to spoil
the resource. In that sense, politicians may face their own somewhat perverse collective action
problem vis-à-vis one another in a way that would make even the most honest politicians political
promises non-credible. Pressures toward corruption might be at play both pre- and post-election;
if they expect other political candidates to buy votes, for example, then they would lose out if they
did not themselves buy votes. And once they are in office, if they expect other political elites to
loot public resources, they themselves would lose out if they refrained from looting public
resources.
Lastly, honest politicians who resist both pre- and post-election corruption pressures still
face yet another problem. Shifting a society from high corruption low honesty to high honesty low
corruption incurs significant transition costs, since there are often powerful interests who benefit
from—that is, are able to extract rents from—the existing status quo institutions and the
distribution of holdings. Even if these powerful interests would be better off under a high honesty
low corruption system (and they almost certainly would), they have little reason to trust that they
would be compensated for the loss of existing holdings and foregone future rents. The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that high corruption low honesty societies are often low trust societies,
where contracts—especially the kind of long-term compensatory contracts that would be required
in this case—are routinely violated without compensation. Powerful and elite interests thus have
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strong incentives to keep corrupt and inefficient systems corrupt and inefficient for they face a
commitment problem with regard to post-transition compensation for lost rents and lost
holdings. This commitment problem then exacerbates the credibility problem faced by potential
voters, for even the most honest politician would need to overcome significant opposition of
powerful entrenched elites in order to make good on pre-election political reform promises.
(b) A preference for collective action. If formal programmatic politics is out of the question, then
why do citizens not organize with each other in order to solve the second-order collective action
problem they face? In other words, if they cannot trust agents to be honest because the rules of
the game are rigged in a way that rewards or encourages dishonesty, then why not change the
rules of the game?
The conspicuous lack of collective action is due to a number of factors related to the class
of individuals — as a political group — who would most benefit from the action. First, this is a
large group in terms of sheer size, and, as Olson predicted many years ago, cooperation amongst
large groups is lower due to the increased risks of free riding as well as the increased coordination
and cooperation costs inherent in large group collective organizing. Second, this large group is
often composed of the poorest and least educated individuals in developing societies, which
means they lack resources and elite political connections. Third, there is a high probability of
intra-group economic competition, since the number of poor and low-skilled laborer’s often
outstrip the available jobs. Fourth, unions—if they exist—exacerbate economic competition
between laborers since surplus labor will tend to suppress the union’s bargaining power and lower
wages. Finally, there is a high probability of intra-group political competition, since various
communities in dire socioeconomic straits are vying for public goods distributed at the informal
discretion of the political elite.55 This fractured, large, and often heterogenous group of
individuals are often in competition with a highly organized highly resourced political elite who
have an interest in keeping the status quo the status quo for the reasons mentioned above.
Organizing large groups of heterogenous individuals is thus often prohibitively costly.
Other, related community wide beliefs raise the costs of cooperation. Consider, for example, the
phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance occurs when individuals mistakenly
believe their own attitudes, motives, thoughts, and so on, are different from other individuals
even every individual’s public behaviour is identical.56 Since there is a gap between private beliefs
and public behaviour, people believe others implicitly endorse a behaviour that almost everyone
privately holds negative beliefs about. In other words, the fact that many people engage in
widespread corruption makes it seem as though many people endorse the practice or at least do
not hold negative beliefs about it, even when most people do in fact hold negative views about it.

55
56

Rudra (2018).
Bicchieri (2016).

19
Pluralistic ignorance exacerbates collective action problems. Widespread discord in
personal normative beliefs (‘I think it is wrong for law enforcement officers to ask for a bribe’; ‘law
enforcement officers should not ask for a bribe’) and second-order normative expectations (‘I
think other people think law enforcement officers should ask for a bribe’) means that many people
will be left with the false impression that there are not enough likeminded individuals to effect
collective action. This results in a fatalism and sense of futility surrounding corrupt practices.
Moreover, pluralistic ignorance feeds into what’s been called the demoralization effect.57
When people begin to believe that the corruption that surrounds them is inevitable and
insurmountable, they might stop engaging in the political process entirely. This is particularly
problematic in democracies that rely on a well-informed and engaged electorate to ‘vote out’ bad
candidates. Indeed, a strong enough demoralization effect severs the very link of accountability
between the public and the candidate. Taken together, the effects of pluralistic ignorance sustain
the vicious cycle of corruption by keeping the benefits of engaging in corruption higher than the
costs of doing so. The false beliefs that drive pluralistic ignorance must be exposed and the
illusion dispelled in order to begin to facilitate anti-corruption collective action.
b. Why non-programmatic politics?
(c) A preference for clientelism. If formal programmatic politics and collective action is out of the
question, then what options are voters left with? They are left with the non-idealized option set
that faces many citizens in developing societies, namely, they can choose to either engage in
“selective collective action,”58 which are often self-serving networks of political elites aiming to
gain access to the spoils that high office gives them, or not engage in the political process (through
non-participation or exit).
Clientelist politics generates its equilibrium stabilization pressures primarily through the
incentives it produces for corrupt politicians. For example, if citizens believe, rightly in many
cases, that both formal programmatic politics and organizing for collective action are not viable
options, then they may themselves demand clientelist transfers. Demand of this sort may then
place politicians, honest or not, into a Prisoner’s Dilemma vis-à-vis one another described above,
namely, and produce pressures for them to buy votes pre-election or to supply highly localized,
targeted benefits post-election. In cases like these, clientelist demands are generated because of
the dire prospects for engagement in formal programmatic politics and the costs associated with
organizing collectively, which in turn create pressures for politicians to engage in corrupt politics.
Note also that this dynamic would stabilize even if the politicians and voters had a preference for
standard, run-of-the-mill programmatic politics, so long as pluralistic ignorance is pervasive, and
individuals are systematically mistaken about others’ preferences for corruption.
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A further equilibrium stabilization pressure comes from the characteristics of the goods
that corrupt transactions between politicians and potential clients. This point bears directly on
the nature of the inducement, as suggested in the definition.59 One incentive-compatible good
that politicians often offer voters in exchange for political support are state jobs. Exchange of
political support for state jobs is incentive compatible for both the patron (the politician) and the
client (the voter) because the politician is able to withdraw the benefit “at-will” (by removing the
client from the job, therefore ensuring continued political support), and the client is given what is
often the best form of employment relative to jobs available in a highly inefficient and
underdeveloped private sector. But since the offer of state employment must remain attractive
relative to private sector employment, corrupt politicians then have a perverse incentive to keep
poorly functioning contract enforcement institutions functioning poorly, for these are the bedrock
upon which advanced economic activity depends. This is an example, of course, of a corrupt elite
generating rents through weakly functioning institutions, which in turn generate commitment
problems and raise transition costs in the dynamic described above. Moreover, it is no surprise, in
light of this reasoning, that developing societies often have highly inefficient economies with
bloated state governments, and where people are often vying for a job in the government rather
than the private sector. Inefficient economies and bloated state governments are a byproduct of
the link that exists between political and economic power for corrupt elites; in that sense, talking
of “weak state capacity” is often a misplaced. Rather, a more accurate understanding of
institutions in the developing world suggests that what is often at play is selective state capacity,
where institutions are highly effective for some (the wealthy political class) at the expense of
others (the poor voters), a state of affairs that reproduces itself through the perverse incentives it
generates for powerful interests.
A key implication of this dynamic is that there need not be a conflict of interest between
the patron and the client. Indeed, clients exhibit a demand for clientelist transfers, since informal
clientelist politics is their sole avenue to express political preferences in a political system where
formal politics is exclusively reserved for the elite. And without a conflict of interest, i.e., without
a misalignment of incentives, principal-agent models and the agency problems they capture
become largely irrelevant to the analysis. The key point here is that while the conditions for
agency problems exist, the actual agency problems do not. The upshot is that clientelism-withoutmonitoring because an efficient political strategy either because there is clientelist demand given
the client’s other viable options, or because patrons are forced into a Prisoner’s Dilemma with one
another, where the costs of deviating from a corrupt “clientelist-transfer” equilibrium are, or are
at least perceived to be, higher than the costs of compliance.
Strategic monitoring is not required in cases like this because the agency issues
underlying the commitment problem are absent when political interests of the patron and the
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(short-term) political interests of the client align. The cost-benefit changes in the long-term, of
course, given the societal costs that everyone burdens that stem from clientelism in general.
Alignment is possible if clientelism offers the best chances for effective political participation: If
clientelism is the most viable means to solve local problems that require solutions on a “public
goods” scale, or even just to receive redistributive private goods from public funds, then electing
the patron who provides those goods is in the interest of the client. Our survey results indicated
that the majority of people who had positive normative beliefs about vote selling did so on purely
prudential grounds, that is, because of practical reasons.
Indeed, the theoretical model presented here complements the empirical evidence which
suggests that clientelism is often the only way in which some communities can satisfy policy
preferences by ensuring clientelist provision of private club goods (effectively local public goods).
Both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that for some particularly vulnerable
communities, clientelism is often the only way to satisfy political preferences by ensuring
clientelist transfer of private club goods (effective local public goods). These groups exercise
political power through informal channels facilitated by clientelist networks often because their
socioeconomic status precludes from them participating in the formal politics. Formal political
and economic exclusion means that excluded groups must turn to informal channels in order to
secure provisions from the state, whether they be local public goods for communities or private
goods for individuals.
The preferential provision of private club goods to a deprived community might
reasonably be regarded as the provision of local public goods to individuals within that
community. But it is precisely the selective provision subject to the informal discretion of political
elites that places the poor in the “Clientelist Trap”—and keeps them there. Self-reinforcing
clientelist politics, on this view, is the result of a pernicious equilibrium: the community enjoying
the local public good will not much care about the fact that its provision was the result of
preferential distribution at the informal discretion of a political elite. But while the benefits are
concentrated in one community, the costs of a system in which public resources are subject to
informal discretion rather than public and transparent rules confers significant costs onto
everyone subject to those distributive rules. Perhaps the greatest costs arise from the perverse
incentive structures faced by both patrons and clients: patrons have incentives to keep poor
people poor since their political power stems from the ability to selective distributive public
resources to those that need it. The incentive structures on both sides of the patron-client
relationship also provide a plausible story as to why clientelism stabilizes as a political
equilibrium.
One empirical implication of these theoretical considerations is that we would expect
individuals to have a preference for clientelism on generally prudential or pragmatic grounds.
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This is precisely what we found during fieldwork in Nigeria.60 Specifically, we found that a
majority of respondents held negative normative beliefs toward vote selling (i.e., they thought
that people should not sell their votes), there was a split between those who did so on nonprudential grounds (43%) and those who did so on prudential grounds (48%). However, due to
the large size of this particular subset of respondents (n=4069) and their uneven distribution
across states, we found significant variation in the relative frequency in types of normative beliefs
across states.
Q3: DO YOU THINK THAT PEOPLE SHOULD COLLECT
MONEY FOR A GIFT OR A VOTE
YES

NO

DON'T
KNOW

ADAMAWA

7.4%

91.0%

1.6%

BENUE

7.3%

91.5%

1.2%

ENUGU

14.0%

80.5%

5.5%

LAGOS

19.2%

77.0%

3.8%

RIVERS

14.8%

83.0%

2.2%

SOKOTO

45.8%

50.1%

4.2%

FCT-ABUJA

20.4%

74.7%

4.9%

Table 2. Personal normative beliefs – “should” across states
Q5: WHY DO YOU THINK THAT PEOPLE SHOULD NOT
COLLECT MONEY OR A GIFT FOR THEIR VOTE?
MORAL

PRUDENTIAL

OTHER

ADAMAWA

77.9%

13.9%

8.3%

BENUE

43.2%

55.5%

1.3%

ENUGU

26.1%

72.6%

1.3%

LAGOS

40.9%

54.2%

4.8%

RIVERS

45.4%

33.5%

21.1%

SOKOTO

44.0%

56.0%

0.0%

FCT-

27.9%

52.0%

20.1%

ABUJA
Table 3. Personal normative beliefs – “should not” across states

60

See Hoffman & Patel (2017, 2020).
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Adamawa, for example, was the only state where the majority of respondents who thought selling
votes was wrong thought so because of moral considerations (77.9%), with a minority considering
it bad to sell votes because it is imprudent (13.9%). In Enugu, however, a sizeable majority
thought that voters should not sell their votes because of prudential concerns with the minority
considering it morally impermissible (26.1%). We found that those who held prudential
normative beliefs against selling votes to be in the majority (amongst the particular subset of
respondents who held negative normative beliefs toward vote selling) in all of the states except
Adamawa and Rivers.

Q4: WHY DO YOU THINK THAT PEOPLE SHOULD COLLECT
MONEY OR A GIFT FOR THEIR VOTE?
MORAL

PRUDENTIAL

OTHER

ADAMAWA

24.3%

58.1%

17.7%

BENUE

24.4%

75.6%

0.0%

ENUGU

5.6%

90.6%

3.9%

LAGOS

4.0%

85.8%

10.2%

RIVERS

3.4%

81.2%

15.4%

SOKOTO

5.1%

94.9%

0.0%

FCT-ABUJA

9.0%

77.3%

13.7%

Table 4. Reasons for personal normative beliefs – “people should sell votes”
In contrast, respondents who held positive normative views toward vote selling (i.e., they thought
voters should sell their votes) did so mostly on prudential grounds (85.3%) rather than nonprudential grounds (7.8%). The distribution of this subset across states was such that over 75% of
those who thought that voters should sell their votes thought so on prudential rather than moral
grounds in all states except Adamawa.
This is significant because violations of shared prudential normative beliefs, unlike nonprudential normative beliefs, do not typically elicit sanctions. To illustrate, consider a community
whose members believe that selling votes is good because they are much more likely to receive
private clientelist transfers than they are to receive programmatic public goods from a politician
after the election. If there is mutual consistency between individual personal normative beliefs
and normative expectations, this particular community’s normative expectations are secondorder prudential beliefs of the following sort: “I believe that others believe that selling votes is
good because they believe they are much more likely to receive private clientelist transfers than
they are to receive programmatic public goods from a politician after the election.” For any one
individual in the community, the motivation for selling one’s vote does not come from the fact
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that everyone in their community agrees that selling one’s vote is the prudent course of action.
Rather, it comes from the content of the shared belief itself.
This general point is true even if individuals in a community holds the opposite belief but
for similar types of reasons. For example, consider a case where a community’s members hold the
normative belief that “I believe that selling votes is bad because if I sell my vote to one party, I
may face violence from another party.” If there is mutual consistency between individual
normative beliefs and normative expectations, this particular community’s normative
expectations are second-order prudential beliefs of the following sort: “I believe that others
believe that selling votes is bad because they may face violence from another party.” Again, the
motivation for not selling one’s vote comes from a reason that is independent of the fact that
many individuals in a community happen to hold it. Crucially, violators in this community (i.e.,
those who sell their votes) would perhaps be thought of as foolish for engaging in risky behaviour,
not sanctioned for violating a shared moral rule.
The results suggest that these two cases – at least in terms of types of reasons – are
reflective of vote selling in at least some contexts in Nigeria. In Sokoto, for example, 45.80% of
respondents thought that individuals should sell their votes, and 94.9% this subset (n=339)
thought so for prudential reasons. In Enugu, on the other hand, 80.5% of respondents thought
that voters should not sell their votes, and 72.6% of this subset (n=377) thought so for prudential
reasons.
Across most states, our conditionality measures revealed that respondents were generally
insensitive to shifts in normative expectations, especially when exposed to those shifts under high
empirical expectation condition. That is, when the hypothetical person in the vignette thought
that everyone was selling their votes, it did not matter what everyone thought about selling votes.
For example, in Lagos, shifting from high normative expectations to low normative expectations
lead to a change of 0.01% in the target’s predicted vote selling, whereas shifting from high
empirical to low empirical lead to a change of 0.08%. Both of these are relatively small changes
and thus are consistent with the idea that vote selling may be a shared prudential norm that is
weakly, if at all, socially conditioned.
If vote selling is driven by shared prudential norms that confers private benefits to
individuals whilst hiding the true social costs of their actions, vote selling is best thought of as a
classic collective action problem. A potential intervention strategy to disrupt this dynamic would
be to destabilize the prudential norm that lies at the heart of the collective action problem by
exposing the tremendous externalities that such activities impose on political institutions. It
should be clear, however, that the effectiveness of any intervention depends crucially on the
content of the prudential belief as well as the conditions on the ground. No amount of information
exposure will curb vote markets if, for example, individuals hold the belief that selling their votes
is the only way to insulate themselves from political violence and that belief is in fact correct. This
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is why the nature of the inducement—positive or negative—is integral to understanding the
overall functioning of the vote market.
(d) A preference for nothing. The last option is to either directly disengage from the political
process altogether, as indicated by the demoralization effect described above. This is,
unfortunately, the option that some of the poorest and politically powerless citizens in the
developing world choose through rejection of the only other viable choice (i.e., clientelism).
The other way to “do nothing” is, of course, exit. But exit is costly, both in economic and
psychological terms. There is a well-established empirical link between corruption and
immigration, and given the dynamic presented here, it is no wonder that people invest significant
resources to emigrate from high corruption low honesty societies to high honesty low corruption
societies. For exit opens up the better options in Option Set 1 (the Ideal Programmatic Option
Set): it is just that the potential for programmatic politics and the benefits it generates lie
elsewhere in the world. The vast majority of the poor in developing societies, however, face
Option Set 2 (the Clientelist Dilemma), and thus become trapped in what I have described as the
Clientelist Trap.
As should be clear, a number of these factors interact with each other to trigger vicious cycles and
thus provide stabilization pressures for a pernicious high corruption low honesty equilibrium.
Developing societies with high endemic corruption are often marked by poorly functioning formal
contract enforcement institutions, resulting in high transaction costs across the relevant markets.
High transaction costs preclude the type of compartmentalization of labor and complex chained
economic relationships that are a precursor for a sophisticated, advanced economy and wealth
creation. In this kind of economic environment, it is often easier to generate rents (by, e.g.,
selectively raising and lowering transaction costs or other corrupt activities) rather than create
value through labor or investment, resulting in inefficient rent-generating political and economic
institutions. Honest politicians wishing to reform inefficient extractive political and economic
institutions then face high transition costs because of commitment problems faced by elites, and
these commitment problems are themselves a result of low-trust due to the aforementioned
poorly functioning formal contract enforcement institutions. These commitment problems then
generate credibility problems for potential citizens, who must then turn away from programmatic
politics to clientelist politics, in turn reproducing the entire vicious cycle.
5. Conclusion
In this chapter, I developed and defended a rational choice neo-institutional account of
corruption. I explicated the theoretical connections between my account and economic and
political development, paying particular attention to the role that institutions (both formal and
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informal) play through transaction costs and trust. I then applied my account to political
clientelism. I provided my own definition of clientelism, one that calls attention to the formal and
informal institutions that structure political relationships that characterize clientelistic nonprogrammatic politics. I then provided a theoretical model of clientelism, the Clientelist Trap,
which illustrated the conditions under which clientelism-without-monitoring might stabilize as
an efficient political strategy (i.e., due to voter preferences for clientelist politics). I also presented
novel empirical evidence to provide content to the theoretical account presented.
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Introduction

Should the international community try to build a place like Singapore on the coast of a place like
Somalia? Some people seem to think so.61 These people are proponents of what are called ‘charter
cities,’ that is, cities created in an initial partnership between a host country and foreign
guarantors that aim to effectively administer institutions that promote growth and wealth. The
institutions of a charter city would ideally protect a set of rights (e.g., of property, of contract, and
so on), uphold the rule of law, and provide otherwise business-friendly economic conditions.
Economist Paul Romer first introduced the idea of charter cities back in 2010, and since then, it
has enjoyed support from within libertarian and classical liberal circles.62
Proponents of charter cities view them as a solution to difficult and complex policy
problems, such as widespread corruption in the developing world and large-scale migration from
the developing world to the developed world. These two problems are, as noted in Chapter 1,
related. The thought is that charter cities will provide a set of fresh high honesty low corruption
institutions and thereby provide people an opportunity to escape the high corruption low honesty
institutions that are ubiquitous in the developing world. Supporters of charter cities go as far as to

61 In the rest of this paper, when I refer to proponents of charter cities, I am referring to, e.g., Romer (2009, 2010); Fuller
and Romer (2012); Freiman (2013).
62 See, e.g., Freiman (2013).
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claim that they provide the potential for a “new model of development that actually works.”63 The
rationale behind this view is that instead of attempting to change the formal and informal
institutions that lead to ineffective governance in places like Somalia, the international
community should instead focus on creating institutions that have worked elsewhere on the
shores of places like Somalia, where people can “opt-in” by moving there and “opt-out” by leaving.
Proposals vary over the precise details of what a charter city would look like, but they
almost all agree that it must (at least initially) be non-democratic in order to secure the kind of
stability required for wealth generation and for trust in institutions to emerge.64 Moreover, the
development of charter cities is heavily tied to private interests, since one central justification for
charter cities is that their institutions must be friendly to investment thereby facilitating
economic development. It’s no surprise, then, that such proposals tend to be welcomed in selfdescribed libertarian and classical liberal circles, since the thought is that pro-growth rules (that
welcome investment and promote economic development) are simple rules that protect a minimal
set of rights held dear by most liberals (e.g., of property, of contract, and so on).
In this paper, I present a classical liberal case against charter cities. My argument
proceeds in two parts: (1) I claim that there are reasons to think that charter cities are not a
morally justifiable form of government by the classical liberal’s lights, even if some form of the
charter city (i.e., a private city) is an ideal form of libertarian government. Contrasting the
positions of classical liberals and libertarians on this position is instructive. And (2) much of the
pro-charter city arguments rest on a set of empirical claims that fuel pragmatic considerations,
but these empirical claims are either false or they actually give us reason to question the very
workability of charter cities.
The arguments in this paper have at least two interesting implications. First, I bring
attention to a rift between libertarians and classical liberals that turns on separateness of persons
constraints on liberal theories of justice, the justifiability of coercive takings for public goods,65
and whether consent to a non-democratic state is possible. I show that the commitments of
libertarianism and the commitments of classical liberalism are at fundamental odds with one
another; this rift is so deep that morally justifiable governments on the libertarian view are
morally unjustifiable on the classical liberal’s view, and vice versa. And second, my arguments
tentatively support one prominent critique of charter cities, namely, that they are a form of
objectionable colonial relations. Moreover, in addition to supporting the colonialism objection,
my arguments go a long way in deflating the response to the colonialism objection from the
proponents of charter cities.

Fuller and Romer (2012, p. ii).
See, e.g., Sagar (2016, p. 514).
65 ‘Public goods’ here means goods that are nonrival and nonexcludable, that is, a good that can be effectively provided to
all and one that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from. Classic examples of public goods are clean air (and other
environmental goods), lighthouses, and national defense.
63

64
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In §2, I present a brief outline of my understanding of charter cities. §3 elucidates the
commitments of libertarianism and classical liberalism. I begin with a discussion of the
Hobbesian social contract. I then show how concepts of inalienability of rights, the provision of
public goods, and the separateness of persons constraints normatively hang together, and how
these linkages differ for the libertarian and classical liberalism. The positions that the libertarian
and classical liberal endorse differ on how these concepts hang together, and this difference has
implications for whether charter cities are morally justifiable. In section §4, I outline one
prominent critique of charter cities, namely the colonialism objection, and show how my account
supports this critique. I also show that the standard response from proponents of charter cities do
not answer the critique. In §5, I summarize a pragmatic argument that proponents of charter
cities put forward in favor of their view, and show that it is untenable. §6 concludes.
2. What are charter cities?
Proponents of charter cities find their inspiration in ‘special economic zones’ (SEZs) found in
developing countries around the world. SEZs typically have different business and trade laws than
the rest of the country in order to attract foreign investment and provide a generally business
friendly environment. Laws in SEZs are typically geared toward reducing the cost of doing
business by providing a business climate with more lenient or flexible labor regulations, lower tax
liabilities, lower customs duties, and so on. Importantly, charter cities differ from SEZs in that
they are created (‘chartered’) through law by the legal authority that controls the sovereign
territory in which the charter city will be located.
There are four features that all charter cities would share are:
1.

Size. First, charter cities are best thought of as expansive SEZs in literal terms of their
physical characteristics. They must be “large enough to eventually accommodate a
city with millions of residents,” and that a “good target size is 1,000 square
kilometers, roughly the size of Hong Kong and Singapore.”66 Moreover, since market
economies rely on trade, an essential feature of proposed charter cities is that they
are in a position to exchange goods and services with friendly trade-partners in order
for their complete independence from their neighbouring countries. This is usually
interpreted as a requirement that they have access to the sea.

2. An actual charter. Secondly, and perhaps one of the most important features of
charter cities, is the idea that an actual charter that “pre-specifies the broad rules”
that would apply within its borders. These “reforms must extend to all the rules

66

Fuller and Romer (2012, p. 3).
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needed to structure interactions in a well-run city and to support exchange in a
modern market economy.”67 These formal rules ought to be broad enough to allow for
experimentation, whereby some experiments will persist and others perish through
market competition.
3. Freedom of choice. Thirdly, there must be a political commitment to choice, which is
usually interpreted as “voluntary entry and free exit for all residents, employers, and
investors.”
4. Rule of law. Fourthly, and finally, charter cities must contain a “commitment to the
equal treatment of all residents under the law,” which is best interpreted as a
commitment to the rule of law.
Charter cities require participating sovereign nations to provide three things: the land on which
the charter city is built, the people that will move to the charter city, and the credible guarantee
that the charter’s rules will be enforced fairly and reliably. What this in effect means is that there
will be a foreign or private (or both) element typically in the enforcement and guarantee of the
charter’s rules: for example, when China presumed control of Hong Kong from the British in
1997, it agreed that justices for the highest courts in Hong Kong could be recruited from other
commonwealth nations (and indeed they were, from places such as New Zealand and Australia).68
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Table 5. Distinctions between types of cities.69
The broad characteristics of a charter city outlined by their staunchest proponents has led to some
confusion as to the precise definition of a charter city. For example, Rahul Sagar finds it puzzling
that Romer and Fuller take Shenzhen to be an example of a charter city since Shenzhen is an SEZ
administered completely by the Chinese government and, as such, Shenzhen does not have
autonomy from the Chinese government. As Sagar explains, this means that “its credibility is
indistinguishable from that of the national [Chinese] authority” which in turn makes the “concept
[of the charter city] redundant.”70
In order to avoid these ambiguities, I present my own taxonomy of cities in Table 5. As
Table 5 suggests, there are a number of governance structure possibilities in the creation of a
charter city. For example, a charter city might be controlled completely by private interests, a
foreign state, and a sovereign state that created it, or be self-governing. It could be a combination
of all four. It might have a public provision of public goods (i.e., its own legitimate police
authority), or it may have a completely private provision of public goods (i.e., private security
services take the role of enforcing contracts and protecting property). What this means is that
there is a range of possible governance structures in charter cities, which theoretically run the
gamut from a completely private city to a completely public one, to a combination of both. Private
cities refers to a city where important governance decisions are undertaken by private actors
(such as developers or large corporations, and so on), and essential public goods (such as police
protection, national defense, and so on) are provided privately. Public cities refers to a city where
important governance decisions are undertaken by public actors (such as a democratically elected
legislative authority), and essential public goods (such as police protection, national defense, and
so on) are provided publicly.
It is important to note that some governance structures in charter city are, of course,
more likely, since the justification of the charter city is that it attracts investment and is generally
“business friendly.” What this means is that governance structures are non-democratic (to ensure
stability) and private interests are heavily involved in the creation of rules (or are in complete
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This is an edited version of the table found in Sagar (2016).
Sagar (2016, p. 512).
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control, as in a full private city). This has been the experience of real life charter cities to date;
Paul Romer, citing transparency concerns, was forced to distance himself from the
Honduran Regiones Especiales de Desarollo (RED)—a proposed charter city in Honduras—after
the then Honduran president signed a memorandum of understanding with a group of private
investors.71 What I will suggest in the coming section is that the completely private city represents
the ideal form of libertarian governance, and that the classical liberal has good reasons to reject
this libertarian utopia. One the main points of contention starts with the question of whether
people are able to consent to the government in a libertarian utopia, i.e., the private city. It is to
this I turn to now.
3. Libertarianism and classical liberalism
a. Hobbes and the alienation contract
Perhaps the most famous instantiation of consent to non-democratic governance comes from
Thomas Hobbes. In this section, I will outline Hobbes’s argument, which will be instructive for
contrastive purposes later in this paper.
Hobbes claimed, contra Locke, that a state of nature (a state in which there is no
government) is equivalent to a mutually destructive state of war. To sum up briefly, Hobbes’s
argument goes something like this: (1) there is a natural equality in the physical and mental
endowments of individuals in the state of nature (any differences between individuals in terms of
these are negligible); (2) this natural equality leads to competition and a state of distrust between
individuals; moreover, (3) given that individuals may be driven by “pride and vainglory” and that
no one individual or group of individuals have a monopoly on violence to enforce contracts,
individuals have an incentive to ‘strike first’ in anticipation of attacks by others to provide for
their security; and therefore (4) this constant insecurity and incentive to strike first leads to the
state of nature—that is the state of war—means that individuals are in “continual fear, and danger
of violent death,” which in turn means that life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”72 In
sum, the state of nature is a state in which individuals are in a “war of all against all.”73
In order to avoid this state of nature, Hobbes contends, it is rational for individuals to
institute a contract to authorize an absolute sovereign that will provide stability necessary for
society itself to exist. The nature of this authorization has been the subject of discussion in
political philosophy, with at least two prominent positions defended: (1) an alienation social
contract, whereby individuals give up (‘alienate’) at least some rights (such as rights to basic selfgovernance) to the sovereign through consent; and (2) an agency social contract, whereby
individuals delegate at least some rights to a sovereign. From the former view, individual’s
71 See https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/01/world/americas/charter-city-plan-to-fight-honduras-poverty-losesinitiator.html and https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/01/under-new-management/
72 Hobbes, Leviathan, I.XIII.9 (1998/1642).
73 Hobbes, De Cive, I.XIII (1984/1651).
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surrender their rights to the sovereign, thus the terms of the authorization constitute a type of
authoritarian relationship.74 From the latter view, the sovereign’s power is loaned to that
sovereign, thus the terms of the authorization constitute a type of principal-agent relationship.75
Notwithstanding the longstanding debate about the nature of authorization in Hobbesian
political philosophy, it remains true that the former view is typically seen as the Hobbesian
alienation social contract, and the latter as the Lockean agency social contract.76 Consider some
representative quotes that motivate this reading of Hobbes:
“Since therefore the conspiring of many wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve
peace, and to make a lasting defence, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which
concern Peace and selfe-defence, there be but one will of all men … This submission of
the wils of all those men to the will of one man, or one Counsell, is then made, when each
of them obligeth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that
one man, or counsell, to which he hath submitted himselfe[.]”77
“The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the
invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such
sort, as that by their own industry, and by the fruits of the earth, they may nourish
themselves and live contendedly; is, to confer all their power and strength upon one man,
or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices, unto
one will … I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this
assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all
his actions in like manner.”78
“In all cities or bodies politic not subordinate, but independent, that one man or one
council, to whom the particular members have given that common power, is called their
SOVEREIGN, and his power the sovereign power. which consisteth in the power and the
strength that every of the members have transferred to him from themselves, by
covenant. And because it is impossible for any man really to transfer his own strength to
another, or for that other to receive it; it is to be understood: that to transfer a man's
power and strength, is no more but to lay by or relinquish his own right of resisting him
to whom he so transferreth it. And every member of the body politic, is called a
SUBJECT, (viz.) to the sovereign.”79

Hampton (1986, p. 114).
Ibid., pp. 114 – 115.
76 Ibid.
77 Hobbes, De Civ, V.VII (1984/1651).
78 Hobbes, Leviathan, II.XVII.13 (1998/1642).
79 Hobbes, Elements of Law, I.XIX.10 (2017/1650).
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The point is that the social contract Hobbes has in mind authorizes a sovereign whose power is
permanent and absolute. The justification for the absolute power of the sovereign comes from
Hobbes’s regress argument,80 which runs as follows: any limited political power in a society must
have its limits placed by another, more powerful political authority. If that more powerful political
authority is itself limited in any sense, then those limits must be credibly imposed by a greater
political power. In the end, for there to be any credible political power, the buck must stop
somewhere, so to speak, in the form of the ultimate political power that can set the limits on other
political power but cannot itself be limited by any other political power. This ultimate political
power guarantees the stability that motivates Hobbes’s political thought, indeed, for him, it is the
definitive feature of government itself.
Thus, on Hobbes’s view, individuals in the state of nature consent to the creation of an
absolute sovereign through an authorization that alienates some of their basic self-governance
rights. That is, they consent to a non-democratic form of government. This is because the stability
that is necessary for civil society itself springs only from the creation of an ultimate authoritative
sovereign whose power is not under the supervision or control of the individuals who have
authorized its power. The type of power Hobbes envisions the sovereign to have is not a fiduciary
power; the power is not held in trust by the sovereign and the sovereign and the individuals who
authorized the sovereign do not stand in a principal-agent relationship with one another.81
a. Liberalism, rights, and the separateness of persons
In the last section, I outlined Hobbes’s famous argument for an authoritarian Leviathan. I now
turn my focus onto liberalism and liberal institutions, since it is the dispute between two liberal
views (libertarianism and classical liberalism) that is the focus of this paper. Hobbes was no
liberal, and it’s no surprise that classical liberals have good reason to reject the Hobbesian
alienation social contract. But, as we shall see, libertarians might have more in common with the
Hobbesian alienation contract than they think.
Liberalism is a philosophical view that stresses liberty and equality. Political liberalism
holds that people are equal, that they ought to be as free as possible to pursue their own
conceptions of the good, and that there are many conceptions of the good that reasonable people
may disagree about. A minimally just liberal society is a society in which people are able to pursue
their own conception of the good while respecting others’ rights and freedoms. Gaus and Mack
identify at least nine core commitments of what they call the ‘liberty tradition’:82
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i.

Normative individualism (i): interpreted as a separateness of persons requirement.

ii.

Individual liberty to be a core political or legal norm.

iii.

Respect for an individual and her liberty requires respect for the individual’s control
of extra-personal objects (e.g., property).

iv.

A desirable social order allows individuals to pursue their own individual conceptions
of the good without legislating an overall common goal.

v.

A social order where individuals are free to make choices within the constraints of an
expansive set of rights is preferred over a centrally planned system (this commitment
stems from an appreciation of Hayekian knowledge problems).

vi.

Coercion is permissible only in the case that it is used to stop impermissible
infringements on the rightful claims of others.

vii.

Political institutions in the liberty tradition authorize the use of force and threaten
and use force against citizens legitimately.

viii.

Liberty tradition rejects a basic distinction between morality that applies to
individuals generally and the public.

ix.

A general presumption against political power in the form of a suspicion that political
regimes have historically ‘engaged in extensive acts of unjustified aggression,
plunder, and meddlesomeness.’

Clearly the liberty tradition is vast and encompasses a range of political thought, from minimalstate libertarianism to classical liberalism to expansive state high liberalism. I take Robert Nozick
to be the paradigmatic minimal state libertarian, and libertarians of this ilk endorse a state that is
limited to the enforcement of a minimal set of rights (most importantly of property and of
contract) and to the resolution of disputes. I take David Hume and Adam Smith, and Friedrich
Hayek to be the paradigmatic classical liberals, and classical liberals of this ilk endorse a relatively
limited state that protects a set of rights and resolves disputes, but also provides a set of noncontroversial public goods. I take Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Rawls to be the
paradigmatic high liberals, and high liberals of this ilk endorse a state that protects a set of rights,
resolves disputes, funds public goods, and allows for redistribution to preserve liberal
institutions.
Those working within the liberty tradition generally accept some form of the above
doctrinal commitments. But the thought here is that to the extent that there are intellectual
disputes between proponents of views within the liberty tradition, they are disputes that,
generally speaking, adopt some variant of most (if not all) of the above commitments.
Most standard contemporary liberal theories of rights invoke some notion of
‘separateness of persons’—which is a combination of a mundane descriptive claim and a more
important normative claim. The mundane descriptive claim is that people are separate—they have
their own lives, values, goals, and so on. The normative claim is that each individual’s life, values,
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goals, and so on, are intrinsically important and ought to be respected to the extent that we have
grounds to reject most aggregative political theories, such as utilitarianism.83 The thought behind
the notion of separateness of persons is simply that we ought to respect the moral status of
individuals qua individuals: it implies that there are some ways in which we may never treat an
individual, that indeed, in some important respect, ‘individuals are inviolable.’84
An acceptance of the separateness of persons is usually built-in to a liberal theory of
rights because it identifies the ways in which a society ought to construct interpersonal rules and
claims that facilitate each individual pursuing their own ends to the extent allowable without
unjustifiably impeding upon another person’s pursuit of their ends. In other words, rights, in this
sense, create boundaries in which one may legitimately pursue their own ends without trampling
upon the rights of others.
Different moral theories may interpret a separateness of persons requirement more or
less seriously. For illustrative purposes, consider the fact that both Nozick and Rawls reject
utilitarianism on separateness of persons grounds,85 but Nozick interprets separateness of
persons requirements more stringently than Rawls. Nozick claims that a proper appreciation of
separateness of persons results in a side-constraint theory of morality, which reflects the
‘underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means.’86 A person’s
property is an inviolable part of their person, on Nozick’s view, such that coercive takings that
result in redistributive policies violate the separateness of persons requirement and thereby some
longstanding commitments of the liberty tradition (in particular commitments (i) to (iv) above).
On a less stringent view, e.g., Rawlsian view, a person’s wealth is not considered part of their
personhood, which in turn means coercive policies that are redistributive do not violate the
separateness of persons requirement. Nozick’s view involves an absolutism about property rights
that is supported quite naturally by his strict interpretation of the separateness of persons
requirement. On a third, but still less stringent view, e.g., a classical liberal view, even if we accept
that a person’s wealth is considered part of their personhood, public goods might still be justified
as a form of coercive takings if the provision of the public good leaves everyone better off than
they otherwise would be. This is by hypothesis true of public goods, and so public goods are
morally justifiable on this classical liberal view.
There is an important distinction, on Nozick’s view, between the structure of morality and
the content of morality. An appreciation of separateness of persons informs Nozick’s “sideconstraint” theory of morality. In other words, accepting normative individualism means that we
must accept that there are “morally binding, absolute, [and] exceptionless side constraints”87 on
how we may treat them.
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But this side constraint theory of morality is independent of the content of morality. The
content of morality is a minimal set of rights that protect life, liberty, property, and contract. Call
these ‘libertarian rights.’ The argument for these libertarian rights, for Nozick, runs as follows: (1)
an agent has a moral right to act however she may choose to with whatever she owns (provided
that her ownership is legitimate), insofar as the exercise of her rights does not encroach on
another agent’s rights. (2) Each person has a right that others do not encroach on their rights.
Violations of rights include theft, fraud, use of force, and so on. (3) Each person enjoys full selfownership. (4) Each person is able to acquire ownership over previously unowned resources as
long as ownership of unowned resources does not leave anyone worse off than if the resources
were left unowned. (5) Ownership rights an agent has over herself and her property are
transferable through voluntary transactions (such as contracts or gifts).88
These rights are ‘state of nature’ rights in that they exist independently of any political
institution that enforces them and independently of others’ beliefs and political views. The moral
justifiability of any given state turns on whether it violates these rights. I refer to Nozick’s view
as collapsing into an absolutism about property rights because there is no case in which
conformity to libertarian rights might be relaxed even if the consequences of conformity might be
quite dire. For example, respecting libertarian rights as stringently as Nozick conceives of them
rules out the very possibility of the public provision of public goods, and this would lead to
situations that one might consider quite dire (or so I shall argue in §4d). Classical liberals have
good reasons to reject the stringency with which Nozick and other libertarians conceive of
libertarian rights, and accepting these reasons has implications on what sorts of governments
each position deems morally justifiable. Before I bring attention to these differences, I will now
turn to Nozick’s justification of the ultraminimal state.
c. Nozick and the ultraminimal state
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick provides what he calls an ‘invisible-hand explanation’ for
how a non-democratic ultraminimalist state might arise without violating the rights of anyone
who comes to live under that state.
For Nozick, individuals living under no state would likely seek protection services in
order to protect themselves from those seeking to harm their person or property. These services
would be offered under market like conditions, that is, with “protective associations” competing
in order to secure clientele to whom they could provide their services.89 A natural monopoly
would likely emerge in the protection services market because conflicts between clientele of
different agencies would require different property claims to be adjudicated by a set of rules that
applies to all. Either a single protective association would overpower others, or it would be
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rational for protective associations to cooperate with one another to prevent costly disputes.
Moreover, this dominant protective association would prohibit people within its geographical
territory from exercising their own rights to defensive violence in order to mitigate the risks
exposed to their clientele that would arise from the independent exercise of such rights. While
these would-be independent exercisers of rights would be prohibited from the sort of defensive
violence required to enforce their own rights, they would be compensated for the loss of these
rights through the free protection services offered by the dominant protective association.
Therefore, for Nozick, a single dominant protective association would emerge, and it
would have two necessary features of a state: (1) a monopoly on violence in a given geographical
territory; and (2) protection of rights of everyone in the territory.90 It’s important to note that
Nozick’s invisible-hand explanation of the ultra-minimalist state is a response to an anarchist
challenge, that is, to the question of whether the state can be justified at all. And what Nozick
claims to have shown is that an ultra-minimalist state can be justified on the grounds that it
would arise “by spontaneous groupings, mutual-protection associations, division of labor, market
pressures, economies of scale, and rational self-interest.”91 Importantly, it would also arise
without violating anyone’s fundamental rights.
It should be stressed that there is no requirement for this libertarian state to be
democratic. Indeed, for the libertarian, there is nothing special about democracy as a form of
government; a non-democratic government that preserves the minimal set of rights that Nozick
favors is more desirable than a democratic government that violates them. In other words, a
democratic government that raises funds through taxation to fund non-controversial public goods
(other than those governed by the dominant protective association) is morally inferior to an
autocratic government that does not tax beyond what is necessary to provide the minimal set of
protective services. Nozick’s interpretation of separateness of persons is so stringent that it
results in an absolutism about property rights, and so there is no room left for comparative
judgments about the relative merits of democratic forms of governance versus other forms of
governance.92
One final point is worth mentioning here. Not only is there no requirement that the
libertarian state justified by Nozick be democratic, but libertarians tend to be openly skeptical or
even hostile to democratic forms of government.93 This skepticism of democracy is fueled by an
empirical claim that democracies may be more likely to routinely violate private property rights
for, e.g., redistributive purposes. Classical liberals such as Hayek share this worry, but libertarians
ought to be even more worried since even coercive takings to fund public goods are unjust on
their view (a view that is not shared by the classical liberal, but more on this in the next section).
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The thought is that a democratic state simply provides more opportunity for transfers of wealth
over a state that limits itself to the protection of a set of libertarian rights.
d. Classical liberalism, libertarianism, and the charter city
In many ways, one form of the charter city (i.e., the private city) represents a real-life
instantiation of a perfect libertarian society: (1) Government institutions are limited to the set of
institutions that one would find in the perfectly libertarian society: to protect against
infringement of a minimal set of rights, to enforce contracts, and to resolve disputes. (2) There are
no democratic institutions, and so the libertarian skepticism about the tendency for democratic
institutions to upset existing distributions of holdings need not apply. And (3) Public goods are all
or in part provided privately. In this section, I present some reasons to question the moral
justifiability of this libertarian paradise.
Before I move on, a caveat is in order. My interpretation of a charter city in this section
might strike some proponents of charter cities as alien to theirs. The people I have in mind here
make a distinction between charter cities and private cities, where the former has a set of public
goods provided by a formal state, and the latter has its set of public goods provided privately. For
example, Paul Romer explicitly rejects the idea of a private city.94 But my characterization of
private cities as a form of charter cities is justified because of three reasons: (1) there is nothing in
the proposals put forward by proponents of charter cities that theoretically rules out charter cities
as private cities, and there is nothing to say that a private city cannot be a type of charter city. This
goes even for non-libertarian proponents of charter cities. Further, (2) there are reasons to think
that a charter city might very well end up as a private city, given the private interests that play a
heavy role in the creation of the charter city. And (3) I do refer to this as a libertarian charter city,
and I claim that libertarians must be committed to the idea that the private city, on their view, is
a justifiable form of government. Proponents of charter cities who do not consider themselves
libertarians may think that the criticisms in this section do not apply to them, though they must
still provide reasons for why we shouldn’t expect charter cities to end up as libertarian private
cities (or even something like libertarian private cities), given reasons (1) and (2).
I now turn to two features of a libertarian charter city that are morally objectionable on
most liberal views, including those of the classical liberal. These are the private provision of public
goods, and the private nature of political power in the charter city.
Private public goods. Recall that, in the last section, I claimed that libertarians have no
theoretical room to make comparative judgments about the relative merits of democratic
governance against competitors other than on the grounds that one respects a set of minimal
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rights (i.e., of property, of contract, and so on) more than another. I claimed that, on the
libertarian view, a democracy that funds uncontroversial public goods through taxation is unjustly
coercive and morally inferior against an autocracy that does not fund public goods but otherwise
protects and maintains rights, enforces contracts, and resolves disputes. A libertarian might
respond to this claim by pointing out that I am begging the question in claiming that they would
reject funding non-controversial public goods through taxation since it’s precisely the moral
permissibility of public goods that is at stake. For the libertarian, all public goods provided
publicly (i.e., by the state), other than the protective services provided by the dominant protective
association, are controversial, since all public goods provided by the state require unjust coercive
takings. That I refer to them as non-controversial seems to imply that an important question is
settled, that I am in fact assuming, in other words, what ought to be shown.
But this libertarian view on public goods is an outlier amongst liberal positions, since
most plausible liberal views reject the idea that the funding of public goods violates nonredistributive norms. Indeed, most liberal views accept the idea that respecting separateness of
persons rejects redistributions whereby some gain and others lose; but the provision of public
goods does not involve redistributive coercive takings since everyone is left better off than they
otherwise would be. Note that this line of reasoning rules out the strict Nozickian interpretation
of separateness of persons and of property rights as absolute; instead, the stringency of the rightclaims surrounding property ought to be as stringent as necessary to serve the particular interests
that serve as the justification of the property right in general. As Gaus and Mack put it:
“If the rationale for rights is their service in protecting people’s basic interests,
the rationale for rights would point to rights of the less stringent sort. In the case
of public goods, agents’ basic interests are served by possessing rights of the less
stringent variety. For this allows coercive takings that are, by hypothesis,
necessary for public goods to be produced whereas more stringent rights would
forbid those takings and leave agents worse off in their basic interests.”95
I take the paradigmatic classical liberal position to accept something along these lines. The claim
that the government is justified in using coercive takings to fund public goods is a line of
argument that stretches back to classical liberals such as David Hume and Adam Smith. This is a
stark point of contrast between the classical liberal and libertarian position: the classical liberal
position does not interpret the separateness of persons in a way that precludes a morally
justifiable state in funding things like public goods through coercive takings.
Note that the justification for coercive takings for the provision of public goods, on this
particular classical liberal view, rests on the idea that the rationale for rights is that they serve an
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agent’s basic interests. Libertarians reject this view. While Nozick himself admits that he provides
no “precise theory of the moral basis of individual rights,”96 it’s clear that the stringency with
which he regards an agent’s rights precludes this sort of rationale. If conformity to his particular
interpretation of libertarian rights is required at all times under all circumstances, coercive
takings are, ipso facto, unjust. The justification of public goods, even if they leave everyone better
off, still runs afoul of the underlying non-consequentialism of Nozick’s view.
What this means is that the libertarian state does not provide public goods because the
provision of public good involves unjust coercive takings. Libertarians emphasize this as one of
their positions: “[I]n the libertarian society … everything will be privatized, there will be no public
property. There will be no public police[.]”97
But, as the above quote suggests, a society cannot function without a minimal set of
public goods; even a libertarian state, where there must be an institutional apparatus to protect
rights, enforce contracts, and resolve disputes, requires what would normally be taken to be a set
of public goods (e.g., security services, national defense infrastructure, and a system of laws and
courts, etc.) In response to this, libertarians either claim that markets will provide adequate
provision of public goods in the absence of government intervention, or they reject the very idea
of public goods as a coherent concept.98 Note that while it’s possible to hold both of these views
independently of each other, many libertarians hold both (indeed, for people like Walter Block
and Hans Herman-Hoppe, the former implies the latter).
But there are at least two reasons to question the private provision of public goods. The
first reason is roughly instrumental: in many cases, public goods are provided privately at the
expense of some other important liberal value, such as equal protection before the law. This is
because of a clash of private and public interests. A society without public goods must leave
important functions of the state, such as its police power, to the market to provide. But market
incentives reward private interests, and private interests come apart from social interests quite
easily. Paul Romer himself writes about the internal handling of sexual assault by university
police departments and religious authorities, where the interests of the institution (the university
and the religious community respectively) are in direct conflict with the interests of the
individuals whose rights have been violated by persons within that institution. Universities may
be hesitant to pursue sexual assault charges against, e.g., members of a sports program (whether
it be players or coaches) because of how lucrative those sports programs might be to the overall
coffers of the university. Similarly, religious authorities may be hesitant to pursue sexual assault
charges against, e.g., Cardinals, in order to preserve the integrity of the institution in the public’s
eye. Cases such as these are ubiquitous and extend to other areas in which normal government
functions have been outsourced to private or semi-private actors; the privatization that fuels the
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military-industrial complex and the prison-industrial complex in the United States are two
particularly disturbing examples.
Lessons from ‘real life’ private cities provide further support for how private interests
depart from social interests. Consider Gurgaon, which is something like a private city,99 just
outside of New Delhi. Many public goods, such as the provision of electricity, water, sewage, and
security, are provided privately in Gurgaon; in 2011, for example, there were 35,000 private
security guards and just 3,100 public police officers.100 As one would expect, security provision is
quite good for those who can afford to pay for it (such as the middle class and above), but quite
bad for those who cannot (the poor).101 Further, even though the security provision is good for
those in the middle class and above, there is still a perception that crime is quite high in Gurgaon
(a perception that departs from reality), where “members of the middle class do not feel secure
and instead see themselves as living on islands of private security surrounded by a sea of
criminality.”102 Security services do not have an incentive to deflate this general perception, and
indeed, their incentives run in the other direction. This is yet another example of the clash
between private and public interests, since a general perception of safety (when security provision
is adequate) is in the interest of the common good. It’s worth adding here that it’s precisely this
sort of “siege mentality” that the Hobbesian Leviathan was intended to remedy, since it’s this
siege mentality that leads to the instability and cruelty of life in the state of nature.
Libertarians might respond to this last line of reasoning by pointing out that the sort of
violations of equal protection I am pointing out are routine even when governments hold the
monopoly on the provision of public goods, in this case, of police protection. It’s not as if, they
might argue, poor people in the rest of Indian society outside of Gurgaon (or outside of any other
private city) enjoy an adequate amount of security along with their wealthier counterparts.
However, the important difference is that when a public government is in charge of providing
public goods and fails to do so in a way that violates equal protection, that government is in some
important way failing its citizens: this failure represents a deviation from the relationship that
ought to be enjoyed between a citizen and their government. But private provisions that result in
the uneven provision of the public good and the violation of equal protection for all is a feature of
a system of market relationships; the important good in question is doled out on the basis of a
person’s effective demand and relative bargaining position.103
The second reason why we might object to the private provision of a public good is
noninstrumental: the private provision of public goods is objectionable because some exercises of
political power ought to be inherently public, and whether a political power is exercised in a
public or private manner hinges, in some important way, on the actor exercising the power. In
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these cases, the political actor must be a public authority in order to secure the good the action is
intended to procure.
One natural way to interpret this claim is to accept that some exercises of public power
are incapable of outsourcing. Avihay Dorfman and Alon Harel hold this view.104 Their argument
runs roughly as follows: Consider privatized criminal punishment, such as private prisons, which
are pervasive in the United States. If criminal punishment is intended to express, beyond
retributive purposes, public condemnation of the act the criminal is being punished for, then the
private provision of criminal punishment necessarily involves the violation of the equality that
exists between the private person (or persons, in the case of a private company) providing the
punishment and the criminal receiving it as persons before the state. In this case, the state has
outsourced its own privilege—to speak and act in its name—to a private citizen; and that private
citizen is then entrusted with meting out the punishment in the name of the public good on
another private citizen. The state, in effect, chooses to privilege one citizen’s judgment for how a
public good ought to be realized over another’s, thereby undermining the moral equality it ought
to afford to both people in question.105 From this view, a private actor who metes out criminal
punishment cannot realize the public good at stake, since the private actor’s actions are not
undertaken in the name of the state.106
Private political power. There is a broader theme underlying the last point here which provides a
stark contrast between the libertarian position and other liberal positions. It is that, in the
libertarian state, political power is not treated as a public power entrusted to the state on behalf of
its citizens. Political power is private power, and the beneficiaries of its exercise are those that
have paid for it. Like the Hobbesian Leviathan, the relationship between the citizens and the state
is not fiduciary.
Things are no different in the libertarian charter city. Since even non-libertarian
proponents of charter cities stress that charter cities will not, at least at first,107 be democratic,
inhabitants of the charter city will have no way to press their interests in the running of the
government or any comparable rights to self-governance beyond entry and exit. Some proponents
of charter cities have claimed that they might eventually transition into liberal democracy, but as I
claimed in §2c, libertarians have reason to be hostile to such an idea. Since consent does all the
normative work in the moral justification of the libertarian state, all that is required for the
charter city government to be morally justified is that its inhabitants have freedom of entry and
exit and that its government respect a minimal set of libertarian rights. Inhabitants are thus asked
to enter into an alienation social contract since they do not enjoy any self-governance rights in the
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charter city; they relinquish them through consent. Nozick explicitly accepts this view when he
writes that
“[I]f someone starts a private “town” on land whose acquisition did not and does
not violate the Lockean proviso, persons who chose to move there or later to
remain there would not have a right to a say in how the town was run, unless it
was granted them by the decision procedures for the “town” which the owner had
established.”108
It’s worth noting, at this point, that libertarians reject inalienability of particular rights ‘all the
way down,’ so to speak, since in addition to the alienation social contract (what might be called a
political alienation contract), libertarian society also permits personal alienation contracts (such
as the voluntary slave contract). In other words, persons are free to contract themselves into
slavery and such contracts are enforceable by the minimal libertarian state. Nozick explicitly
states that persons can fully relinquish their rights of self-ownership through consent when he
asks “whether a free system will allow [a person] to sell himself into slavery.” He answers in the
affirmative: “I believe that it would.”109
The claim that some basic rights, such as those to self-governance and self-ownership,
can be alienated even with consent and through contract represents a stark departure from
standard liberal thought. This rejection of the alienability of particular rights (call them
inalienability arguments) has a long history stretching back to at least Spinoza, but perhaps one of
first classical liberal treatments of the inalienability of some rights comes from Adam Smith’s
teacher, Francis Hutcheson. Hutcheson claimed that:
“Rights are also divided into the alienable, and such as cannot be alienated or
transferred. These are alienable, where the transfer can actually be made, and
where some interest of society may often require that they should be transferred
from one to another Unless both these qualities concurr, the Right is to be
deemed unalienable. ’Tis plain therefor, for instance, that for defect of both these
qualities, our opinions in matters of Religion and worship are unalienable; and so
are our internal affections of devotion; and therefor neither of them can be
matters of commerce, contract, or human laws.”110
Hutcheson, therefore, presents two conditions for the alienability of a right: that it (1) is actually
transferrable (call this the non-transferability condition), and that (2) there is some overriding
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social interest for that right to be transferred (call this the social interest condition). Liberty of
conscience fails these conditions, not least because of the fact of privacy of individual judgment
deems it impossible for a person to give up their liberty of conscience.111
Inalienability arguments tend to emphasize the first condition by positing that certain
rights are inalienable because they simply cannot be transferred. Consider personal alienation
contracts, which most liberal views take to satisfy this non-transferability condition. Contracting
with another party to sell oneself into slavery asks the contracting parties to recognize one party
of the contract as something they are not: a non-person, or a piece of property. But a person is a
person and not a piece of property, and no amount of consent can change this basic fact. A
contract through which someone sells themselves into slavery, then, is a kind of contract fraud
because, as Kant claims, “[n]o one can bind himself by a contract to the kind of dependency
through which he ceases to be a person, for he can make a contract only insofar as he is a
person.”112 From this view, libertarian society in which people are able to make personal
alienation contracts which are recognized by the legal apparatus of the state is a society in which
such contract fraud is institutionalized.113
Liberal inalienability arguments against personal alienation contracts are rooted in the
fundamental equal moral status afforded to individuals qua individuals that lies at the heart of
the liberty tradition. This moral equality is what drives the normative individualism and the
separateness of persons requirement that flows from this appreciation of normative
individualism. Some classical liberals, such as James Buchanan, have referred to this as a “natural
equality.”114 From this view, persons ought to be treated as moral equals in the organization of
society because any individual differences that may exist between them are simply normatively
irrelevant.115 Libertarian societies in which inalienable rights are treated as alienable with consent
and through contract offend this basic moral equality because the state recognizes (and asks the
citizens of the state to recognize) some people as less than people, indeed, as property, or as Kant
puts it, as having “enter[ed] into the class of domestic animals.”116 Citizens of the state are asked
to recognize persons as less than persons on this view not because someone has consented to
being treated like a slave, but because the personal alienation contract that posits the fiction that
one party is a piece of property is enforceable by the entire legal apparatus of the state.117
This liberal class of inalienability arguments generalizes from the personal alienation
contract to the political alienation contract, since the political alienation contract involves the
surrendering of what are taken to be inalienable rights: self-governance rights. Political alienation
contracts undermine the moral equality of persons because they give some people a place in a
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social hierarchy over and above others; in the case of charter cities, inhabitants of the libertarian
charter city—most probably the workers—are a part of a political class that has no say in the
administration of the charter city or in the governance structures under which they live. They are
necessarily placed lower, on the social hierarchy, than the private political powers that govern the
libertarian charter city. Such an arrangement is at odds with liberal thought:
“[The] postulate of natural equality places the classical liberal directly and
specifically at odds with all those who, explicitly or implicitly, accept the Platonic
postulate of natural hierarchy. To Plato there are natural slaves and natural
masters, with the consequences that follow for social organization, be it economic
or political. To Adam Smith, by contrast, who is in this as in other aspects the
archetype classical liberal, the philosopher and the porter are natural equals with
observed differences readily explainable by culture and choice.”118
And the implications for accepting this natural equality are quite clear for Buchanan:
“The postulate of natural equality carries with it the requirement that genuine
classical liberals adhere to democratic principles of governance; political equality
as a necessary norm makes us all small ‘d’ democrats.”119
Accepting this natural equality thus means respecting a form of governance in which there are no
natural masters and no natural slaves. This allows persons to delegate their self-governance
rights but not alienate them, since to alienate self-governance rights is to, in effect, enter into a
master and slave contract. And no amount of consent can change the fact that, as individuals,
there are no masters and there are no slaves. Thus, a government is morally justifiable, on this
classical liberal view, only if it respects the natural equality between persons and is structured
around the implications for social organization that flows from this respect.
4. The colonialism objection
One of the principal criticisms levied against charter cities is that they an instance of one morally
problematic political relation of the past: that of the colonizer and the colonized.120 In response to
this line of criticism, proponents of charter cities typically emphasize the voluntary entry and
freedom of exit enjoyed by inhabitants of charter cities. This does not answer the colonial critique
for two reasons: first, in the non-ideal world, it’s not clear that the voluntariness of entry and
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freedom of exit is as ‘clean’ as would be required for the response to hold normative weight. But
second, and perhaps most importantly, even if we do grant that residents have freedom of entry
and exit, there seems to be something wrong with the basic associative structure between the
governed and the government in charter cities, i.e., that the associative structure is based on the
ostensibly voluntary alienation of the residents’ right to be ‘sovereigns’ or ‘principals’ in matters of
social organization (to use James Buchanan’s turn of phrase).121 It is the nature of this basic
associative structure that motivates the claim that charter cities represent an objectionable
instance of colonialism. Before I turn to these two arguments, it is instructive to briefly outline
Laura Ypi’s theoretical account of colonialism on which my critique draws.122 It is to this I turn to
now.
(a) The wrongs of colonialism
Ypi’s account of what’s wrong with colonialism draws on Kant’s “cosmopolitan” critique of
commercial and colonial practices as they were practiced by European colonial powers from about
the sixteenth century onwards. Kant claims that each human being has a right of hospitality, i.e., a
right to not be treated with hostility when they “present [themselves] for society.”123 This
“cosmopolitan right” of “universal hospitality” belongs to “all human beings by virtue of the right
of possession in common of the earth’s surface.”124 This right is limited to conditions of universal
hospitality which makes it distinct from more expansive rights, such as the “right to be guest” in a
foreign land. What this means is that all human beings have the right to present themselves on
foreign lands and extend offers of political association without being treated with hostility (as
long as the person presenting themselves also behaves “peacably”). Note that this right is about
how the initial presentation and offer of political association is made: it governs the conditions
that structure interaction between two people foreign to each other (or groups of people foreign to
each other) without specifying what the outcome of the interaction out to be: “The other can turn
him away, if this can be done without destroying him[.]”125
The cases that Kant uses to illustrate violations of this cosmopolitan right are instructive
in that they show another feature of his account that go beyond simply specifying just conditions
as regards initial contact to also providing the outlines of an ideal political association that
respects “the claims of all those involved in the exchange.”126 For example, he claims that while
people have the right to settle on any unclaimed land they please (and this right flows from the
fact that all of humanity holds natural resources in common), a special contract is required if
unclaimed open land is required by a nearby group for their sustenance (as is the case with
hunter-gatherer or shepherding groups).127 In cases such as these, settling in these areas “may not
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take place by force but only by contract that does not take advantage of the ignorance of those
inhabitants with respect to ceding their lands.”128 What is required in cases like these is a just
political association that takes into account the varying interests at stake in such an interaction
and potential settlement. Importantly, Kant argues, the need for these interests to be articulated
and defended cannot be silenced by other supposedly overarching considerations as the ones that
were used to justify the use of force during the height of Europe’s colonization efforts, such as
force is necessary because “it is to the world’s advantage, partly because these crude peoples will
become civilized … and partly because one’s own country will be cleaned of corrupt men[.]”129
As Ypi points out, Kant’s cosmopolitan critique rests on an analysis of colonialism as a
departure of a political association of a particular sort, i.e., one that treats everyone in that
association—all parties whose interests are at stake—in accordance to norms of reciprocity and
equality. This ideal political association requires “political institutions that allow people to relate
to each other as equals, guaranteeing that their voice will be heard and their claims will be equally
taken into account when decisions affecting both are made.”130 In concrete terms, what this
means that the political association that results from two different groups of people coming into
contact with each other must have equality and reciprocity built into its design; it is in this sense
that colonial political relations are wrong because they are constituted by precisely the kind of
political relations that violate these associative norms.
b. Consent
Proponents of charter cities respond to charges of colonialism by stressing the various choices
involved in establishing a charter city. For example, Romer claims that,
“[C]harter cities are based entirely on voluntary actions. Only a country that wants to
establish a charter city will do so. Only people who want to live and work under the
rules specified in the city's charter will move there. Free choice is essential for the
legitimacy of the rules in a charter city. It is also what makes a charter city very
different from colonial occupation.”131
Others echo this sentiment.132 The problem with this response is that it seems Polyannish to think
that the consent given will be as free and as voluntary as is required by the argument that claims
that free and voluntary consent quells concerns of objectionable colonial political relations.
Consent can be compelled, particularly when there is a large discrepancy between the relative
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bargaining power of two parties negotiating a contract. Romer is sensitive to this fact and so
explicitly claims that a “country that is subject to a military intervention has little true freedom of
action and choice.”133 Presumably, then, if the United States wants to be a foreign guarantor of a
charter city in Belize and the government of Belize “consents” to opening up a charter city, under
threat of military intervention, one can hardly say that Belize truly consented to opening up the
charter city in any meaningful way. Indeed, even for Romer, then, that would look dangerously
like a neo-colonial pursuit on the part of the United States.
But we need not go as far as to talk about military intervention with respect to the tools
that states have to compel or coerce consent. Anybody with a cursory knowledge of international
relations can attest to the fact that powerful states have a number of ways to put pressures on
states, particularly in the cases of large discrepancies in power, where the term power does not
only refer to military might. For example, policy tools might run the gamut of economic sanctions
from boycotts, to trade restrictions or barriers, to embargoes, to full scale blockades. The United
States is the largest export market and leading import source for countries such as Barbados and
Belize; and if the United States decided to stop trading with Barbados and Belize, such a move
would surely cripple those economies. And this problem is not limited to countries with relatively
small economies: indeed, even countries with economies as large as Japan depend upon imports
to provide enough food to sustain their population. To put it clearly, a globalized economy where
countries play to their relative comparative advantage means that countries with large economies
will be able to enact policies that might cripple other economies without having to revert to
military intervention.
Moreover, charter cities will typically be proposed in places where there is a pressing
need for capital investment. This presents a very real concern that host countries and charter
cities will be reliant on the foreign guarantors in an objectionable way, since it is the fact that
foreign guarantors guarantee the administration of the city and the credibility of its institutions
that facilitate the investment in the first place. In cases such as these, consent may be given freely
and voluntarily, but it is the relationship of dependence of the host country and charter city to the
foreign guarantor that does the normative work in charges of objectionable subordination of a
poor country (the host country) and the rich country (the foreign guarantor) that motivates the
underlying charges of colonialism.134
Finally, aside from ‘national’ consent issues, there are obvious problems with individual
consent for the people who will end up populating and working within the charter city.
Proponents of charter cities themselves pitch the idea as a solution for policy problems such as
widespread corruption in the developing world and the large-scale migration from the developing
world to the developed world. The people moving to charter cities, then, will likely be people
escaping societies in which corruption or violence is rife, and it’s easy to see why moving to the
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charter city might be done out of sheer necessity rather than free choice. The underlying point is
that background conditions under which the choice is made might undermine whether the choice
is made freely, and this fact might frustrate the normative work done by the notion of consent.
c. Domination
One theme of Kant’s critique of colonialism is that colonial relations are characterized by
domination and subjugation of one group over another. One way to avoid a political association
characterized by domination and subjugation is to design institutions such that they reflect norms
of reciprocity and equality. There are good reasons to suspect that charter city institutions do not
reflect these norms.
Consider again the fact that charter cities rely explicitly on the idea that the people
subject to the laws of the charter city do not have a say in the administration of key governance
issues that are likely to arise, such as labor laws, taxation, and the general workings of the justice
system. It should be emphasized that proponents generally see this as a virtue of charter cities,
since what lends credibility to the new institutions is the promise of political stability and
business friendly rules. Political stability in this case is secured by institutions that have reliable
and stable rules that favor capital (i.e., investment), and these rules are not subject to democratic
change.
The arguments that motivate the classical liberal critique of the libertarian position in §2d
identify precisely what is objectionable about the political relationship prospective inhabitants of
charter cities are asked to agree to. There’s no need to repeat the arguments here, but suffice to
say that, in a nutshell, charter cities represent an objectionable political relationship because they
violate norms of equality when they ask inhabitants to enter into a contract through which they
relinquish their basic rights to self-governance. Such a contract violates the moral equality
afforded to persons because it means that some people are placed lower on the social hierarchy
than others, and they are placed in a position such that they have no way to press their interests
even with respect to decisions that will affect them. Conceiving of some rights as basic means that
they cannot be overridden for precisely these sorts of considerations, i.e., that they will yield, on
aggregate, desirable outcomes even if some people must bear a burden (of a loss of rights) in the
short term.
Recall that proponents of charter cities tend to stress the consent of the inhabitants of
charter cities as a response to the colonialism objection. An interesting feature of Ypi’s account is
that it deflates this response, since what drives the charge of colonialism does not turn only on
whether individuals have consented to the charter city. There is something objectionable about
the governance structure of the (non-democratic) charter city itself, and what makes this
structure objectionable stands independently of whether the inhabitants have consented to it.
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6. Pragmatic arguments
Proponents of charter cities often cite pragmatic considerations that they claim weigh heavily in
favor of the establishment of charter cities. The literature contains what might be called feasibility
arguments, that is, arguments that contain the claim that charter cities are more practicably able
to deliver on the goals of development (i.e., increases in human welfare through prosperitycreating institutions) than other feasible alternatives. In this section, I highlight one potential
problem with this view, namely, that it does not take into account the importance of informal
rules with respect to economic development.
a. Informal institutions matter
Proponents of charter cities claim that one reason why they are more feasible in delivering their
stated aims is because they provide a fresh set of institutions that promote economic growth
which will in turn lead to vast improvements in welfare. It’s best to think of ‘institutions’ here as
sets of rules that promote economic growth. For example, it’s generally well accepted that a
system of rules that protects private property backed by effective coercive enforcement
mechanisms will provide the right kind of incentives that induce sustainable and long-term
investment. It’s also generally well accepted that sustainable and long-term investment is a
necessary condition for raising living standards. This requires a number of well-functioning
institutions: financial institutions that are able to direct capital to its most productive uses; legal
institutions that specify property rights and adjudicate property disputes fairly; and law
enforcement agencies that enjoy a monopoly on violence which allows them to effectively enforce
property rights. What is important about these institutions is that they must be legitimate in the
descriptive sense, i.e., the populace that these institutions serve must have trust in these
institutions such that they abide by their decrees and respect their judgments.
A lot turns on whether these institutions will be effective as the fundamental point
underlying charter cities is that the primary constraint on development is the inability to create
and implement the right sets of rules. Romer explicitly states that the “central task of reducing
global poverty is to find ways for developing countries to adopt new rules that are known to work
better than the ones they have.”135 The idea that Romer is getting is what is known as the
institutional view of development, a view that is perhaps best defended by Daron Acemoglu and
James Robinson.136 The institutional view of development stresses the importance of economic
institutions, such as institutions that protect property rights, to economic development; the best
way to explain why one society is wealthier than another society is through analyzing their
relevant institutions and the impact these institutions have on comparative development. The
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view states that what determines whether a society develops is whether it creates the right sorts of
incentives for investment, and whether this happens turns on the sorts of incentives that are
created by institutions (or sets of rules) that people in that society obey.
The thought is that charter cities promise to deliver these elsewhere-tested institutions by
bypassing the domestic institutions of the local host countries as well as evading the collective
action issues that inhibit domestic institutions from becoming prosperity-creating institutions.
Broadly speaking, these collective action issues arise when individuals have a preference to act in
accordance with good rules (e.g., act honestly) and it’s in everyone’s interest to do so, but each
individual has an incentive to act dishonestly because they believe that others will also act
dishonestly. Developing countries with widespread corruption are paradigmatic examples of this,
where almost each individual has a preference to live in a high-honesty low-corruption society,
but they are stuck in a ‘bad equilibrium’ of a high-corruption low-honesty society because acting
honestly in such a society is costly relative to acting dishonestly (as I argued in Chapter 1).137
Economic development is stunted in societies like these where people view economic interactions
as a zero-sum game, levels of trust are low, and transaction costs are high.
Note that this is a comparative judgment about the relative likelihood of inducing
compliance to prosperity-inducing rules between a new charter city’s institutions against their
domestic counterparts. Bryan Caplan captures this idea perfectly when he claims that,
“In principle, Third World countries could put nationalistic prejudice aside and ‘import’
the written and unwritten rules that have made the West rich. But this is extremely
difficult. Intense populist opposition aside, it is hard to graft one country’s institutions on
to another's - especially when entrenched interests fight you every step of the way. This is
true in the business world as well. Competitors often try and fail to adopt leading firms'
‘best practices.’ Corporate culture is notoriously stubborn. In both business and politics,
success often requires a clean slate. It is easier to open a new WalMart than to make the
Kmart chain better. Advocates of charter cities argue that is also easier to bring in
"outside management" to make a new city that works than to reform existing countries
that don't.”138
But there are at least two reasons to question this line of reasoning. First, modern economies are
characterized by a host of both formal and informal institutions. In many cases, what stunts
economic growth in developing countries is not the “nationalistic prejudice” in importing the
rules that have worked elsewhere, but rather the informal institutions that make compliance with
the formal institutions costly, or the perverse incentives that are created at the intersection of
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informal and formal institutions. Indeed, many developing countries have formal rules about the
illegality of corrupt practices, property right protection, and the like, but there are a set of
informal rules that render these rules redundant. To continue with Caplan’s analogy, it’s just not
clear that opening a new WalMart but populating it with the people who used to work at Kmart is
better than trying to change the culture—the informal institutions—at Kmart better.
The general point is this: what motivates the comparative judgment that a “blank slate” of
institutions will be better able to deliver sustainable and long-term economic growth is that
domestic institutions suffer from a number of collective action issues that stunt growth. But what
drives these collective action issues are not the domestic institutions themselves, but the informal
norms that underwrite the costs and benefits of compliance with these formal institutions. These
informal rules will not suddenly disappear once they are presented with a “blank slate” of formal
rules. This is well illustrated by the fact that pernicious social norms, such as forced marriage or
honour killings, do not suddenly disappear from the communities in which they are practiced
once those communities migrate to countries in which those practices are illegal. Think, for
example, about the South Asian diaspora in the United Kingdom: forced marriages and honour
killings persist in parts of the United Kingdom amongst the South Asian diaspora even in the face
of the credible institutions and under threat of enforcement of laws that ban these practices.
One might respond to this line of reasoning by pointing out that there is evidence that
formal rules also influence informal rules. This is the move that Christopher Freiman makes.139
The problem with this response is this: recall that the comparative judgment about charter cities
being better than domestic institutions is that they promise growth-friendly rules that the
domestic institutions lack. But the domestic institutions typically do not formally lack growthinducing rules; they have a set of unwritten rules that renders them redundant. If it were the case
that formal rules on their own would be able to “control corruption, secure personal property, and
stabilize expectations,” or influence informal institutions to the degree required to do these
things, then we wouldn’t need the charter cities in the first place. In the end, comparative
judgments about the relative efficacy of bad domestic institutions of host countries against the
good foreign institutions of charter cities smack of a kind of selective idealization: proponents of
charter cities tend to idealize institutions promised by the charter city but are non-idealistic about
the domestic institutions. But the same reasons that motivate the suspicion of changing bad
domestic institutions also seem to apply in the case of new foreign institutions.
Of course, proponents of charter cities are sensitive to the importance of informal
institutions to the functioning of modern, well-functioning economies. Indeed, Freiman himself
writes that “development economists stress that we cannot discount the contribution of informal
norms and customs to a society’s stability, efficiency, and cohesion” and, as such, the
“indispensability of informal norms should temper our enthusiasm about the ability of charter
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cities’ formal institutions to bring about prosperity by themselves.”140 My point here is that, taking
the indispensability of informal norms seriously means that we should question, rather than just
temper, our enthusiasm with respect to charter cities.
6. Conclusion
In §2, I introduced a contrastive taxonomy of types of cities in order to motivate my
understanding of the paradigmatic charter city. In §3, I discussed the Hobbesian social contract
before outlining the minimal commitments of classical liberalism and libertarianism. I showed
that the inalienability of rights, the provision of public goods, and separateness of persons
constraints hang together normatively in both views, but the way they relate to each other differ
significantly on either view. In §4, I outlined Ypi’s account of colonialism and showed that the
arguments in this paper, taken with Ypi’s account, support the colonialism objection against
charter cities. I also showed that the standard response from proponents of charter cities (i.e., to
stress consent) fails against this objection. In §5, I showed that pragmatic arguments in favor of
charter cities are unconvincing because they do not take into account the informal institutions
that drive the pernicious practices that proponents of charter cities wish to eradicate.
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CHAPTER 3. The natural and the social in the
metrics of justice
1.

Introduction

2. Resourcism and the capabilities approach
a.

Quality of life determinants

b. Purely personal heterogeneities
c.

Compensation claims for natural inequalities

3. The status of natural inequalities
a.

Natural and social causes of inequality: a view from disability studies

b. Interactionalism all the way up: gender and norms
4. Measuring global justice
5. Conclusion
I. Introduction
Should an appropriate metric of justice be sensitive to internal individual differences? Rawlsian
resourcists claim that the answer to this question is no.141 These resourcists claim that persons are
entitled to a kind of standardized package of resources provided by the basic structure of society
as a matter of justice.142 On this view, individuals might still appeal for a greater share of
resources in virtue of a relevant individual difference (such as being born blind), but this appeal
cannot take the form of a demand of justice.143 Capability theorists claim the answer to this
question is yes. These capability theorists insist that the provisions of the basic structure of
society ought to be sensitive to the way individual differences interact with forms of social
organization and other what might called “environmental” factors.
Whether an appropriate metric of justice should be sensitive to internal individual
differences rests in part on whether principles of justice ought to be sensitive to these internal
individual differences. Further, whether principles of justice ought to be sensitive to internal
individual differences is also informed, at least in part, by how we conceive of these differences.
How these questions are resolved rely on an underlying understanding of a natural/social
inequality distinction, one that is much invoked in theories of justice.144 Prominent resourcists

141 There are many different conceptions of resourcism. In this paper, I focus exclusively on Ralwsian resourcism unless
otherwise explicitly stated. The position I have in mind is articulated by Rawls himself (1999), Pogge (2002, 2010), and
Freeman (2006, 2018).
142 The capabilities approach, or capability theory, also has much “internal diversity.” I aim to set aside this internal
diversity as much as possible and instead try to focus on features of the approach common to all, or most, of its
proponents. The position I have in mind is articulated by Sen (1999), Nussbaum (2011), and Robeyns (2017).
143 Pogge (2010).
144 See Lewens (2010) for good discussion on this point.
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hold that the distribution of natural endowments (innate traits and dispositions) is not just or
unjust in itself. This provides motivation for the view that a metric of justice ought not to be
sensitive to particular types of individual internal differences, since a distribution that is neither
just nor unjust does not require us to rectify or justify the inequalities that arise from it.
The literature on resourcism and capability theory, and the central disputes between
them, is vast. I do not attempt to square away all issues here. Rather, I focus narrowly on a
critique of the capabilities approach levied by prominent resourcists which turns on how the
respective theories treat “natural” inequalities in their preferred institutional orders. I call this the
compensation for natural inequalities critique:
(1) Compensation for natural inequalities critique. The capability approach metric is
committed to compensatory claims of justice for distributions of natural
endowments—distributions that are, on the resourcist view, neither just nor unjust.145
In this paper, I argue that capability theorists are able to accept both that distributions of natural
endowments are neither just nor unjust while also maintaining that a theory of justice’s metric
ought to be sensitive to individual variation (even when this variation has, at bottom, a “natural”
(innate, biological) component). This is because capability theorists are able to adopt a more
sophisticated understanding of the natural/social distinction, one that stresses the interaction
between the two through the mediating role of both formal and informal institutions. What lies at
the heart of this understanding is a particular conceptualization of the nature of disability,
namely, the interaction model.
The arguments in this paper do not conclusively settle the debate between resourcists or
capability theorists. My aims are more modest. Instead, the contributions of this paper are (1) to
pinpoint the where the two approaches disagree but also, importantly, where they agree; (2) to
introduce some of the complexities of the natural/social distinction, for while it is much-invoked
across political philosophy, it is often drawn in simple causal terms at odds with our best
understanding as provided by theoretical and empirical developments in both disability studies
and biology; and (3) to relate this theoretical dispute about the appropriate metric of justice to the
more practical concerns regarding how we ought to make comparative evaluations (e.g., of
poverty and other welfare-outcomes) across countries. The goal of the arguments in this paper is
not to tip the hat decisively toward the resourcism or the capabilities approach, but rather to
clarify the nature of the dispute and move the debate forward on common ground.
In §2a, I briefly outline resourcism and the capabilities approach, paying special attention
to the the wide agreement between the two approaches in their more sophisticated forms.146 §2b
Pogge (2010).
I take Rawlsian resourcism, with its focus on social primary goods, as a more sophisticated version of the resourcist
position. This view might be contrasted with what might be thought of as cruder forms of resourcism, such as those that
focus exclusively on, e.g., income metrics as a matter of justice.
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attempts to pinpoint the precise point that the views putatively diverge, namely, with respect to
the distribution of natural endowments (and the natural inequalities they may give rise to). §2c
then formulates and explicates the resourcist’s central critique of the capability theorist’s metric:
the compensation for natural inequalities critique. §3a shows that the capability theorist might
adopt an understanding of the nature of disability, the interaction model, that largely deflates the
resourcist critique. §3b relates the underlying characteristics of the interaction model, its focus on
the interaction between putatively natural traits and their environment, to broader
understandings of the role that formal and informal institutions play in development outcomes. I
pay special attention to the problem of gender in this subsection. §4 then shifts gears from a focus
on what kinds of inequalities might trigger compensation claims under the two respective views to
how their respective metrics fare with respect to comparative evaluative judgments of welfarerelevant outcomes across countries. §5 concludes.
2. Resourcism and the capability approach
A central point of contention between resourcists and capability theorists concerns the kind of
metric that should be endorsed as a public criterion of social justice—a criterion that is to be used
to make comparative evaluations of individual advantage. The public criterion of any theory of
justice is of significant practical import, since it is precisely the public criterion that forms the
basis of evaluating how feasible alternatives to institutional arrangements measure up to the
demands of justice (however they end up being specified).
Resourcists claim that the appropriate metric of justice ought to be defined in terms of
social primary goods,147 which Rawls specifies as follows:
(1) The basic liberties (freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, etc.) are the background
institutions necessary for the development and exercise of the capacity to decide upon
and revise, and rationally to pursue, a conception of the good. Similarly, these liberties
allow for the development and exercise of the sense of right and justice under political
and social conditions that are free.
(2) Freedom of movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse
opportunities are required for the pursuit of final ends as well as to give effect to a
decision to revise and change them, if one so desires.
(3) Powers and prerogatives of offices of responsibility are needed to give scope to various
self-governing and social capacities of the self.
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(4) Income and wealth, understood broadly as they must be, are all-purpose means (having
an exchange value) for achieving directly or indirectly a wide range of ends, whatever they
happen to be.
(5) The social basis of self-respect are those aspects of basic institutions that are normally
essential if citizens are to have a lively sense of their own worth as moral persons and to
be able to realise their highest order interests and advance their ends with selfconfidence.
According to Rawls, social primary goods are those goods that are reflective of “various general
facts about human needs,”148 and, as such, are requirements of free and equal individuals living a
complete life. They are best thought of as valuable resources that a just political order affords its
citizens access to. It is the difference in individuals’ (reasonable) expectations of primary goods
over a lifetime that constitute the inequalities that generate justice-relevant advantage and
disadvantage, and so are the normatively salient for comparative assessment of various
institutional schemes. From this view, a person is the least advantaged in a well-ordered society—
a society in which their basic rights and liberties are secure, and they enjoy fair opportunities—in
the case that they “belong[] to the income class with the lowest expectations [of primary
goods].”149 The implication is that alternative political arrangements should then be judged in
terms of individuals’ expectations of (as Rawls puts it), or their access to (as Pogge puts it), the
valuable resources constitutive of social primary goods.
Capability theorists, on the other hand, claim that the appropriate metric of justice ought
to be defined in terms of what they take to be substantive freedoms—what they call capabilities—
that one would need in order to choose a life one has reason to value.150 Rather than focus on the
expectations of or access to the external resources required to exercise those freedoms, the
capability theorist shifts the normative focus to a person’s ability to meaningfully promote their
own ends given the resources they are entitled to. This necessarily implicates each individual’s
ability to convert social primary social goods into the functionings or capabilities that constitute
their own ends.
This disagreement that gives rise to the difference in choice of metric is about the extent
to which principles of justice ought to be sensitive to internal differences, broadly defined as
“natural endowments.” These natural endowments include internal qualities like the set of genes
a person is born with. The resourcist view calls for a kind of standardized package of social
primary goods to be provided for as a matter of justice, which is based on a “selection,
formulation, and weighting of valuable resources on some account of standard human needs”
(emphasis in original).151 Capability theorists claim that provisions provided by the basic structure
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of society, in the service of securing important capability sets (sets of functionings), ought to be
sensitive to individual variation. This is because different persons might require different
amounts of resources to secure the same capability or set of capabilities. Pogge sums up the
central difference: “[c]apability theorists assert, while resourcists deny, that a public criterion of
social justice should take account of the individual rates at which persons with diverse physical
and mental constitutions can convert resources into valuable functionings.”152
One reason why capability theorists take their account to be superior in terms of its public
criterion is that it fares better at capturing key determinants of a quality of life that, so capability
theorists allege, resourcist accounts are not—and, in principle, cannot be—sufficiently sensitive
to. That resourcist accounts fail to capture these key determinants of a quality of life in principle
is an important caveat since capability theorists sometimes contrast their views with
impoverished resourcist accounts when more sophisticated ones are readily available. In what
follows, I provide a brief overview Sen’s original proposed list of key determinants and contrast
capability theory with what I take to be a sophisticated resourcism so as to accurately reflect the
real divergence between the two positions, as well illustrate the significance of this divergence.
(1) Environmental diversity. Variation in the environment (such as temperature and
likelihood of disasters) will levy different costs and benefits subject to what Sen refers to
as specific “climatic circumstances.”153 For example, costs to maintain comfortable
temperatures and reasonably manage environmental risk will be higher in some parts of
the world than in others; Alaskans spend more on heating than do Arizonans and
Mississippians spend more on flood insurance than do New Mexicans. If the resourcist’s
standardized package is not sensitive to this variation, then Alaskans and Mississippians
will bear more of a burden to have a comparably similar quality of life to their Arizonan
and Mississippian counterparts simply because more of their income is spent on
mitigating the externalities of environmental variability.
On this point, the capability theorist and resourcist contrast most sharply if we
assume that the resourcist’s standardized package admits of only a fixed, non-variable
income. But if we take the standardized human needs, rather than the income required to
achieve those needs, as fixed, it becomes clear that (at least some level of) sensitivity to
environmental variation is easily built into a plausible resourcist account. This is because
what is troublesome about problematic climatic circumstances in question, from the
resourcist view, is that they force individuals who live under those conditions to expend
more resources to have access to the “standard” level of resources (e.g., expenditure on a
coat to achieve a temperature within a normal range in which human beings can
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comfortably work, to use Pogge’s example).154 In other words, a person’s expenditure on
“extra” resources in order to achieve access to the level of resources they ought to have
access to should properly be included in the overall inter-personal evaluative accounting.
(2) Social climate. Salient aspects of the social conditions in which people live, such as
“public educational arrangements … prevalence or absence of crime and violence …
[i]ssues of epidemiology and pollution … [and] the nature of community relationships”155
will play a significant role in the way personal incomes and resources are converted into
quality of life. One way to capture this concern is to think about the role that public goods
(such as a basic level of education, low crime, a clean environment, a healthy population,
and a sufficient population-wide level of social capital) play in allowing individuals to
convert personal resources into what they take to be a life worth living. Access to a
standard package of personal resources does not mean much in terms of quality of life if,
for example, one lives in a high crime area where property rights are routinely violated.
Resourcists might respond to this concern in two ways. First, a society which
lacks the provision of a basic set of public goods—the sort that would give rise to the set of
concerns Sen is raising here—would violate its citizens basic liberties, liberties that a
standard resourcist account ought to be sensitive to.
Second, sophisticated resourcists view the provision of public goods as
constitutive of a well-ordered society since justice itself is not a normatively neutral
cooperative enterprise, but rather a “social union”156 in which “people have their shared
ends and regard other members’ success and flourishing as complementary to their
own.”157 A “private society” in which “each person assesses social arrangements solely as a
means to his private aims … [and] no one takes account of the good of others, or what
they possess”158 is unjust on this view, even if such a society succeeds in the provision of
public goods through the selfish contributions of its citizens. The upshot is that a society
which lacks provision of basic public goods is incompatible with both the resourcist and
capability approach account, even if the underlying rationale for the incompatibility may
differ.
(3) Relational perspective. The advantage and disadvantages individuals face may turn on
specific community-wide factors, such as others’ resource levels. For example, the poorest
Americans may be many times wealthier than the poorest Nigerians in absolute terms, yet
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they may nonetheless face very real capability deprivation (such as being unable to
participate in their community’s civic and political life).159
Resourcists are easily able to accommodate this relational perspective by
acknowledging that the value of an individual’s personal resources is often dependent on
the value of the relevant community’s resources.160
(4) Interfamalial distribution. The conversion of social primary goods into freedoms enjoyed
by individuals is somewhat complicated if the basic unit of analysis is the family. It is
often the case, especially in patriarchal societies, that men are compensated for their
labor in a normal market exchange whereas women—undertaking “invisible work” within
the family, such as caretaking and domestic labor—are not. A metric that focuses
exclusively on the income generated by the family unit alone misses the complications
that arise with the problem of intrafamilial distribution, and the (typically gendered)
inequalities they bring the fore.
Since resourcist accounts generally fall within the liberty tradition outlined in
Chapter 2, they all share a commitment to normative individualism (typically interpreted
as a separateness of persons requirement). Separateness of persons means that we ought
to respect the moral status of individuals qua individuals, and that it is an individual’s
goals, values, freedoms, and so on, that are of intrinsic importance. In other words, taking
the familial unit as the unit of analysis for the conversion of primary goods into freedoms
is at odds with a fundamental commitment of the resourcist account.161
On the four key determinants mentioned so far—environmental diversity, social climate,
relational perspective, and interfamilial distribution—both the resourcist and the capability
approach offer adequately sensitive accounts. Sen’s critique of resourcism is rather a critique of a
rather crude sort of resourcism, one that focuses income measures as proxy for welfare
assessments. As Rawls’s list of social primary good shows, resourcism can (and does) go well
beyond that, even if non-governmental multinational institutions do not.162 But the key
divergence between the capability approach and these more sophisticated forms of resouricsm,
and therefore the site of the “real contrast,” as Pogge puts it, is how the two views treat what Sen
calls personal heterogeneities. It is to this I turn to now.
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b. Purely personal heterogeneities
(5) Personal heterogeneities. People’s needs are diverse in light of “disparate physical
characteristics connected with disability, illness, age or gender, and these make their
needs diverse.”163 A metric of justice must be sensitive to differences that arise due to
personal heterogeneities, so the capability theorists argue, because differences in these
sorts of characteristics will affect the conversion of social primary goods (such as income)
into the “real” freedoms that people ought to be able to enjoy.
The capability theorist critique is that the resourcist framework, because of an
indifference to the variance in conversion rates of primary goods and resources into
whatever good that is valued, remains indifferent in cases where such conversion rates
matter importantly with respect to justice: “Of two persons with identical incomes and
other primary goods and resources (as characterized in the Rawlsian … framework[]), one
may be entirely free to avoid undernourishment and the other not at all free to achieve
this.”164 And the resourcist account fails to be sufficiently sensitive to a set of cases in
which differential conversion rates affects how the ends of the ‘standard package’ of
Rawlsian resources are actually realized, because the standard package—being what it
is—remains entirely indifferent to.165
On the one hand, this critique does in fact point to a central disagreement between the two views
for, as Pogge claims, resourcists, contra capability theorists, “define and consider individual
shares without regard to the particular features of the persons whose shares they are.”166 The
implication is that the defining the resourcist metric consists in “weighting selected [primary
social] goods relative to one another … guided by some conception of the standard needs and
endowments of human beings,”167 rather than the specific disadvantages felt by individuals’ (in
light of their natural endowments) ostensibly required by a metric endorsed by capability theory.
On the other hand, we must be careful not to exaggerate the difference in terms of
sensitivity between the two views. This is because the resourcist account can in fact accommodate
a set of cases that the capability theorist has in mind—a set that is, admittedly, smaller than the
broader set of cases that fall under “personal heterogeneities,” but which nonetheless goes some
way in deflating the capability theorist’s critique. Sensitivity to this particular set of cases is
triggered in light of two principles that are compatible with sophisticated resourcist accounts: the
normative individualism principle (mentioned above) and the prior wrongdoing principle. Since

Sen (1999, p. 148).
Sen (1992, p. 33).
165 Ibid.
166 Pogge (2010, p. 35)
167 Ibid.
163

164

63
sophisticated resourcists might accept these two principles as core commitments of their view,
they are able to go quite a way to deflate the capability theorist’s critique.
Consider first the normative individualism principle. Once we accept normative
individualism, any “standard package” must also be sensitive to the fact that a standard package
catered for a single adult human is not adequate for, say, a mother and child—whether during
pregnancy or breastfeeding.168 Further, future children have pre-birth needs, these needs give rise
to extra needs for a pregnant woman.169 Children, in other words, are individuals and generate
their own justice-relevant needs and claims, and this fact (along with its metric-relevant
implications) are quite easily accommodated in light of the resourcist commitment to the
normative individualism principle.
Second, the prior wrongdoing principle reflects the fact that “the members of a society or
other social system have a have a duty of justice to mitigate the harms caused by their prior
wrongdoing.”170 Sensitivity to at least some set of the cases that capability theorists have in mind
are captured by this principle in the case that the severe mental or physical disabilities that give
rise to specific special needs are caused by the “effects of severe past (and present) resource
deprivation: lack of effective civil and political rights and inadequate access to water, food,
shelter, health, care and education.”171 The prior wrongdoing principle allows the resourcist to
distinguish between justice-relevant and justice-irrelevant disabilities, where the former is
implicated into the resourcist metric whereas the latter is not. Justice-irrelevant needs and claims
are those that arise because of what Pogge calls pure personal heterogeneities—inequalities that
arise due to differences in natural endowments, self-caused factors (such as drug abuse), or pure
luck. Inequalities caused by these kinds of factors do not give rise to claims of justice. Rather, they
are viewed as misfortunes of a “natural lottery,”172 one which society does not have a justicerelevant duty to rectify or remedy even if there may be “quite stringent” duties of humanity or
solidarity.173 The prior wrongdoing principle reflects the view that heterogeneities that give rise to
compensation claims couched in terms of justice are justice-relevant in virtue of their causal
origins. A person whose disability is the result of some prior wrongdoing on the part of society
(e.g., injury on a public transport system) has a justice-relevant claim whereas person whose
equivalent disability is the result of, e.g., bad genetic luck does not.
c.

The compensation for natural inequalities critique

In the last section I claimed that the resourcist responds to the capability theorist by pointing out
that a set of cases—those captured by recognition of the normative individualism principle and
the prior wrongdoing principle—can be accommodated under their account, and therefore are
included under the insensitive-to-internal-difference metric they endorse. And so it is the set of
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cases that fall outside of the grasp of these two principles where the real disagreement lies, that is,
in cases where the inequalities between persons are caused by differences in natural endowments
and that have their causal origins in pure personal heterogeneities.
These so-called natural inequalities generate no claim to justice because society “did not
contribute to their emergence and does not benefit from their existence,”174 and so, from the
resourcist point of view, it is a virtue of the account that their metric is able to exclude them. One
reason for taking this as a virtue is because of the institutional implications of the divergence of
the views: resourcists “seek an institutional order under which the distributive pattern of
resources access satisfies their preferred criteria” and, allegedly unlike the capability theorist,
“they pay no attention to how this distribution correlates with the distribution of natural
features.”175 This line of reasoning forms the underlying rationale for the central resourcist
critique of the capability theorist:
a) The compensation for natural inequalities critique. The capability approach metric is
committed to compensatory claims of justice for distributions of natural
endowments—distributions that are, on the resourcist view, neither just nor unjust.
Compensatory claims of justice here refer to complaints that aim to compensate for
disadvantages that might be chalked down to natural inequalities. These are distinct from what
Pogge refers to as intrinsic discrimination complaints and extrinsic discrimination complaints.
Intrinsic discrimination complaints are complaints against an institutional order that overtly or
covertly disadvantage persons based on ostensibly natural characteristics (e.g., race or sex)
through the execution of its rules. Extrinsic discrimination complaints are complaints against an
institutional order that fails to compensate individuals disadvantaged because of historically
discriminatory rules (e.g., failure to pay reparations for past injustices).176
Resourcists claim that institutional schemes inspired by the capability approach run into
an attendant set of problems in light of its commitment to compensation claims for natural
inequalities:
b) The vertical inequality problem. By mandating an institutional arrangement in under
which distributions of natural endowments are taken to be justice-relevant, the
capability approach conceptualizes of natural inequalities (and natural human
diversity) in vertical terms. Thus, the capabilities approach views human beings as
“better or worse endowed.”177
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c) The imprecision problem. By mandating an institutional arrangement in under which
distributions of natural endowments are taken to be justice-relevant, the capability
approach fails to specify a criterion of justice aimed at achieving “equity among their
beneficiaries … and equity also among their contributors.”178
d) The demandingness problem. By mandating an institutional arrangement under
which distributions of natural endowments are taken to be justice-relevant, the
capability approach generates the “highly demanding” and psychologically unrealistic
requirement that “persons to share the fruits of their cooperative efforts equally with
those who do not participate.”179
These four concerns are, of course, intimately linked. A natural way to read the above is that
because of (a), then (b), (c), and (d). For example, (b) vertical inequality is, on this view, but a
symptom of an institutional arrangement that unduly generates compensation claims for
distributions that are not just nor unjust in themselves. Inequalities borne of natural endowments
(“purely natural inequalities”) do not generate justice relevant disadvantages, and therefore do
not stand in need of rectification or justification by a minimally just institutional arrangement.
Further, (c) imprecision and (d) demandingness might appropriately be regarded as two
sides of the same coin. Imprecision here refers to the precision with which the normative rules
specify who gets what, and who pays for it—the beneficiaries and contributors to whatever it is
that is the subject of those rules. The administration of these rules simply is the administration of
justice, since it is these rules that take from some and give to others (under threat of legitimate
coercion) as a means to achieve an overall just distribution. In any egalitarian theory of justice,
which of course includes both resourcist and capabilities approach views, a specified relevant set
of inequalities ought to be justified or rectified according to the normative rules specified by the
theory in question. Since the conceivable natural inequalities that exist between individuals may
be—and probably are—many, their rectification would impose severe obligations on the nonbeneficiaries of that rectification. Imprecision means under-specification of the relevant rules
(e.g., distributive rules), thus resulting in a theory of justice that generates (many) demands in the
form of compensation claims on behalf of some beneficiaries at great cost, if realized, to other
contributing non-beneficiaries.
In what follows, I leave aside the problems of imprecision and demandingness, and focus
instead on the central critique (a) and the vertical inequality problem (b). But it is worth
mentioning two points before moving on here. First, the arguments in this paper rely on an
underlying presumption that capability theorists are interested in an institutional scheme that
does not take purely natural inequalities themselves as a matter for our justice-relevant
178
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obligations. Capability theorists need not accept this presumption, however, and instead endorse
a type of radical egalitarianism whereby natural inequalities per se do in fact give rise to claims of
justice. One way to read the resourcist’s critique is in these terms, i.e., that capability theorists are
committed to a radical egalitarianism without the theoretical resources to delineate between
inequalities appropriate for rectification or in need of justification (e.g., those arising from
artificial restrictions on wages) and those that are not (e.g., individuals who are insufficiently
attractive to attract a sexual partner) in a principled way.180 It seems clear that imprecision and
demandingness would be most acutely felt in an institutional scheme that reflected this kind of
radical egalitarianism. I take this in itself to be a compelling reason to reject this kind of radical
egalitarianism. I also take it that capability theorists are not necessarily committed to such a view.
Indeed, some capability theorists, such as Elizabeth Andersen, explicitly reject the view.181
Second, despite the fact that I leave aside the problems of imprecision and
demandingness, they are still relevant for the overarching arguments in the paper. This is because
what I aim to show in the next section is that some inequalities that resourcists take to be purely
natural have a justice-relevant social component, therefore raising them to candidacy for
legitimate government intervention (in terms of either rectification or in need of justification).
But whether these inequalities should in fact be rectified would require a balancing of the justicerelevant practical concerns that are part-and-parcel of policymaking, such as the distribution of
costs and benefits of the government action, which I take as the concerns that the problems of
imprecision and demandingness raise to the fore. The argument, in other words, is not that
showing that an inequality has a justice-relevant social component means that that inequality
must be rectified or justified, but rather that the question is not a closed one as if it would be if the
inequality was shown to be a purely natural inequality in a way that renders it justice-irrelevant.
4. The status of natural inequalities
a. The natural and the social: the interaction model
One way capability theorists might respond to the resourcist critique is by denying that they are
indeed committed to compensatory claims for “purely” natural inequalities. Rather, armed with a
more sophisticated understanding of underlying distinction between natural and social
inequalities, they might further claim that at least some of the cases resourcists have in mind as
purely natural are actually social and therefore trigger legitimate compensation claims under a
just institutional scheme—on both the resourcist and capability theorist understandings of what a
just institutional scheme requires. The key point is that many inequalities—even those that seem
paradigmatically natural in the relevant sense—actually arise from the interaction between
“internal endowments, [] external resources, and the social and physical environment which
180
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[they] find themselves.”182 Thinking about the natural/social distinction in terms of the relevant
interactions has a long history, particularly in theoretical debates as to how to conceptualize the
nature of disability, and so it is worth briefly outlining the three prevailing “models” in this
literature to situate the subsequent discussion.
(i)

The medical model. One way to define disability is as a deviation from biomedical
norms. This is what is known as the medical model, or the individual
pathological model, since the focus is on the inability of the particular individual
to achieve some species-wide functioning. A person born blind, on this view, is
unable to read because of an individual functional limitation; their eyes are not
“working” the way they ought to, and we know that because of the way the
relevant community’s eyes do in fact “work.”183 The gap between a person’s
functional limitation and the functional norms of the community are thus treated
as a medical phenomenon requiring medical correction or prevention through,
e.g., biological screening.

(ii)

The social model. In stark contrast to the medical model of disability, the social
model, or the social pathological model, rejects the view that disability is best
thought of in exclusively medical terms as an individual’s functional limitations.
Instead, proponents of the social model view disability as a problem of social
organization and social institutions (both formal and informal). Social model
theorists make a distinction between an individual’s impairment, which may be
thought of purely in individual and biological terms, and disability, which may be
thought of purely in terms of social organization. Impairment itself is not viewed
as a problem but rather “it is the way difference and impairment manifest
themselves in our social institutions that results in a problem.”184 Where the
medical model takes an individual’s impairment as a sufficient condition for
disability, the social model rejects the idea that impairment is even a necessary
condition for disability. Disability is, in other words, purely a matter of social
organization and social oppression even if impairment is purely a matter of
individual traits and biological endowment.185 On the social model, a person born
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blind may have what is thought of as a difference or an impairment—that is, their
eyes do not operate in the same way as others’ do—but the inability of that person
to, e.g., read is solely a matter of whether the requisite social infrastructure has
been considered and put into place (i.e., whether there is an adequate availability
of braille books).
(iii)

The interaction model. In contrast to both the medical and social model of
disability, the interaction model views disability as best understood as a complex
interaction between an individual’s impairment and the mediating role of formal
and informal institutions—the environment—which provide the “disabling facts
of one’s impairment.”186 The interaction model, contra the medical model, rejects
the idea that an individual’s impairment is a sufficient condition for disability,
but also, contra the social model, rejects the idea that an individual’s impairment
is not a necessary condition for disability. There is, in other words, a recognition
of a causal relationship between one’s impairment and one’s disability in the
interaction model that is absent in the social model. On the interaction model, a
blind person’s inability to read is a matter of social organization (e.g., the
availability of braille books) but it is the underlying “physical fact” of blindness
that interacts with the “institutional fact” of braille book availability that causes
the disability.187 Interaction model theorists recognize, where social model
theorists do not, the “inevitable physical foundation of the social phenomena [of
disability].”188

Which model an institutional scheme reflects has implications for the overarching resourcist and
capability theorist debate since what is often at taken to be the decisive factor as to whether an
inequality is “justice-relevant” is often framed in simple causal terms. From this view, social
inequalities are caused by factors such as social rules and regulations, and these are the sorts of
inequalities a just institutional scheme should justify or rectify. For example, when all the
desirable jobs with liveable wages are restricted to a particular ethnicity of the population,
inequalities arising from this “artificial” restriction are due to a social cause. Natural inequalities,
by contrast, stem from factors such as biological or psychological (or otherwise “natural”)
dispositions or traits. These natural inequalities are the sorts of inequality that do not require
justification or rectification under a just institutional scheme. When one group is better off than
another group because of a difference in an innate (e.g., biopsychological) trait (such
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intelligence), inequalities that arise from the relative advantage the presence of that trait confers
are said to arise because of a natural cause.
In this framework, the medical model views all inequalities stemming from disability as
naturally caused whereas the social model views all inequalities stemming from disability as
socially caused. The resourcist critique of capability theorist’s metric is, in a sense, an accusation
of an institutional scheme that incorporates the worst aspects of both of these models: first, the
capability theorist aims for an institutional scheme that generates compensation claims for purely
natural inequalities (an institutional scheme inspired by the social model); and second, the
capability theorist aims for an institutional scheme that views individuals as having better or
worse natural endowments (an institutional scheme arguably inspired by, or at least guilty of the
most affinity with, the medical model). I return to this latter point below.
But capability theorists can comfortably reject both of these views. It is the interaction
model, and its subsequent view of the nature of the interaction between the natural (innate traits)
and social (formal and informal institutions), that sits most comfortably with the view of the
distinction endorsed either explicitly or implicitly in the capability theory literature.189 This allows
the capability theorist to retain what they take to be a virtue of their account—sensitivity to
individual variation—without sliding into a radical egalitarianism that would be a natural
consequence of an institutional scheme that endorsed the social model (and so recognized any
and all disabilities to be legitimate candidates for justification or rectification in the form of
compensation complaints in virtue of their being social caused).
To illustrate the interaction between the natural and the social as characterized by
interaction model, consider phenylketonuria (PKU). PKU is a genetic disorder that causes severe
intellectual disability. Individuals who have PKU are unable to convert the amino acid
phenylalanine into other amino acids. Since high levels of phenylalanine cause severe brain
damage, individuals who have PKU, if untreated, will develop severe intellectual disability.
However, in most industrialized societies, new-born infants are routinely screened for
phenylalanine levels. New-borns with PKU (who screen for higher-than-normal phenylalanine
levels) are kept on a special low-phenylalanine diet, and do not develop intellectual disability.
This is a clear case where a social factor (appropriate medical screening and subsequent dietary
restrictions) directly influences, in a causally relevant way, the phenotypic expression of the
natural factor (gene endowment) as it relates to an outcome that may or may not generate a
compensation claim (inequalities borne from having an intellectual disability). From the view of
the interaction model, the relevant intellectual disability is only realized if the requisite forms of
social organization (appropriate medical screening and subsequent dietary restrictions) allow for
it, but the underlying physical fact of the gene endowment also plays a causally efficacious role.

189

See, e.g., Anderson (2010); Nussbaum (2002, 2006, 2009).

70
Many resourcists take variation in genetic endowment to be a matter pure personal
heterogeneity and so the inequalities that arise in light of such variation as justice-irrelevant. It is
here where the PKU case, and many other cases that have a similar causal structure, are
particularly illuminating.190 This is because these cases show that it is difficult to separate out, in
the relevant way resourcists may want to, the distinction between inequalities caused by a natural
lottery in terms of gene endowment and inequalities caused by formal and informal institutions.
Are individuals who have severe intellectual disabilities as a result of untreated PKU simply
unlucky, for they were born with the wrong genes, or is society “on the hook” so to speak, for
inadequate social organization and unjust distribution of medical resources?191 Capability
theorists who endorse sufficientarian standards for, say, intellectual outcomes can accommodate
the complex interdependencies involved in cases like these and reflected by the more general
interaction model in a way that less sophisticated versions of resourcism cannot. They can do this,
crucially, without viewing the distribution of natural endowments as a matter of justice. And it is
worth noting that this nuanced understanding also leaves open the possibility that there are
“pure” natural inequalities, such as those experienced by individuals whose (severe) disability
would not be mitigated under varying social institutions.
Sophisticated resourcists seem well aware of these complex interactions. For example, in
the context of inequalities that arise from disabilities, Pogge claims that “special needs and
disabilities in which social causes play no role at all are rare.”192 Indeed, this point is part of a
broader argument for why resourcism can take into account a wide range of personal
heterogeneities against Sen’s initial criticism (outlined above). So with this in mind, it is not clear
why these complex interdependencies between natural and social do not flow down to internal
natural endowments as well, considering that genes can be considered to be the “canonical
natural resources” and that “[i]t is a platitude of behavioural genetics that the causal action of a
given gene is dependent on the environment in which it is found.”193 The point here is that it
seems as though, even by a sophisticated resourcist’s lights, the inequalities that would count as
those legitimately able to generate compensation claims are larger than what resourcists
themselves take to be the case. Both views are able to accept that “purely” natural inequalities do
not generate claims of justice on their own, but that in many cases what look like purely natural
inequalities are actually mediated by socially controllable forms of social organization.
Recognition that the interaction model is the underlying view of disability in the
capability theorist’s preferred institutional scheme also goes some way in deflating the vertical
inequality problem identified by Pogge. From the capability theorist’s view, persons are not better
or worse endowed than others since what is salient with regard to institutional arrangements is
the forms of socially controllable social organization that mediate the causal relationship between
For a good overview, see Lewens (2010).
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an individual’s impairment and the disability. There does not seem to be a stigma attached to the
claim that children with PKU are entitled to the some form of medical attention early on in life
lest they develop severe intellectual disabilities later on in life, for example. Rather, the vertical
inequality problem seems to be most acutely felt by an institutional scheme that endorses the
medical model of disability. Indeed, it is true that the medical model characterized much of the
assessment and conceptualization of disability in the twentieth century, and this characterization
did indeed lead to much stereotyping and stigma of disabled persons as a result. This is because
the medical model places the focus on the individual by positing that the innate trait or otherwise
natural disposition is the sufficient cause of the relevant inequality in question. But capability
theorists need not, and in fact do not, endorse the medical model, and thereby are not guilty of
viewing individuals as better or worse endowed.
It is worth mentioning here that some social model theorists argue against both the
medical model and the interaction model on the grounds that they lead to the unwarranted
stigmatization of those with disabilities.194 The claim here is that both views are guilty of
recognizing a causal link between impairment and disability, even if medical model theorists take
impairment to be sufficient and the interaction model theorists take impairment to be necessary.
It is the fact that there is a theoretical link at all, so social model theorists allege, that triggers
stigmatization and stereotyping. This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between what it
means for a cause to be sufficient or necessary, for in this case the interaction model shifts the
view from individual pathology to social organization in a way that mitigates the vertical
inequality worry. Thus, this particular critique from social model theorists fails for similar
reasons to why Pogge’s critique fails.
These three models and their underlying characteristics provide instructive analogies that
generalize beyond disability. What is particularly important for our purposes is the way the three
models treat the causality with respect to innate or natural traits or dispositions and social
organization. The medical model views disadvantages as being caused purely in terms of innate or
natural traits; the social model views disadvantages as being caused purely in terms of social
organization; and the interaction model, the one I think most accords with the capability
approach, views disadvantages as being caused by a complex interaction between both innate,
natural traits and the social organization in which they are found. In the next section, I outline
briefly what this interactional way of thinking means for understanding of “natural traits” beyond
disability.
b. Interaction, institutions, and gender
In the last section I claimed it is not clear how to distinguish between the relevant social and
natural factors in the simple causal terms as required. Even what we ordinarily take to be purely
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natural traits of individuals or features their natural environment often crucially rely upon social
conditions and rules (e.g., formal and informal institutions) for their relevant causal effects. I
made the case that this interactional thinking goes “all the way down to genes,” that is, what we
might take to be the clearest example of purely natural causes. In this section, I consider the way
other forms of social organization may play a role in mediating “natural” facts of our environment
beyond just genes.
Consider, for example, food distribution. It’s reasonable to think of the availability of food
as a paradigmatic feature of the environment and so of a species’ natural endowment—directly
related to the soil fertility, temperature, adequate water supply, and so on, in the relevant
geographic area. Yet whether there is enough food for individuals in a given community is often
determined by societal distribution networks or social rules determining who gets what, and
when. As Sen has argued convincingly, even famine has less to do with Malthusian pessimism
about the relative properties of population growth and agricultural productivity than it does with
the distribution of existing food supplies and shifts in purchasing power due to speculation,
hoarding, or inflation.195
Social norms and other informal institutions that regulate the distribution of food and
other resources may produce conditions that disadvantage some groups over others all while
masking the subsequent disadvantage with the appearance of an underlying “natural” cause. For
example, “table manners” in patriarchal societies often dictate that men and boys should eat
first—over women and girls—leading to predictably disastrous outcomes for women and girls in
resource constrained environments. In cases like these, it’s not that there is not enough food to go
around or that women and girls are particularly susceptible to malnutrition or the diseases that
come along with, but rather there are social rules governing who should eat first, and how much
they are allowed to eat. Men and boys eat first and they are also given preference for secondhelpings, if there are any to go around. Social rules such as these may confer disadvantage to
some groups overtly but there may also be other subtler norms at work, as when women and girls
must meet a higher threshold of pain or discomfort before a family decides it appropriate to seek
medical attention for a potential underlying medical condition.
Note that this point is entirely compatible with the view that there are natural differences
between individuals or groups. Consider biopsychological differences between the sexes.
Evolutionary psychologists often claim that, over the course of human evolutionary history,
different sexual selection pressures in ancestral environments have resulted in systematic
differences between the sexes (i.e., sexual dimorphism). A primary difference posited in this
regard concerns the respective parental investment (the investment by the parent in the offspring
that increases the offspring’s chance of survival at the cost of the parent’s ability to invest in other
offspring) between the two sexes.196 Law professor Kingsley Brown, drawing inspiration from this
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line of reasoning, claims that women increase their reproductive success by “devoting the bulk of
their parental energies to investment in children, through provision of milk and other forms of
direct care taking,”197 whilst men increase reproductive success “through the attainment of high
status and control of resources,” giving them access to multiple and the “most desirable” mates.198
As a result, Browne claims, men are, inter alia, more likely to take physical and nonphysical risks
and be physically stronger than women, whereas women exhibit greater verbal skills and are more
bound to their infants than men. This sexual dimorphism is then taken as an explanation for
disparate societal outcomes (such as variation in occupational patterns between the sexes). For
example, Browne claims sexual dimorphism is the reason why there are more male CEOs (since
men prefer high-risk and/or high-reward occupations), and why there are more female nurses
and stay-at-home-mothers (since they prefer caretaking occupations or prefer to forego the labor
market altogether in order to raise children).
But even if systematic differences implied by this particular interpretation of sexual
dimorphism do exist, there are still a host of social rules—such as rules governing the
permissibility of bringing children to work or community-wide expectations about the
appropriate level of risk a woman ought to take on as part of her working life—that explain
disparate labor market outcomes in a causally efficacious way. Social technology also plays a
causal role, of course, especially if particular innovations shift the relative costs and benefits of
choices in a way that would interact with the suggested natural traits. For example, ride-hailing
mobile applications for taxi cabs (such as Lyft or Uber) lower the transaction costs involved in the
cab services market by providing relevant information about the trustworthiness of driver and
rider to the relevant parties, thereby reducing the level of risk attached to driving a cab for a
living. If it were true that women are naturally more risk averse, technological innovation
exemplified by the ride-hailing application software created by Lyft and Uber would still render
open previously “too risky” potential occupations. From this view, social rules and/or social
technology play an important part—perhaps the important part—in the relevant labor market
outcomes rather than the putatively natural underlying traits posited in a way that forecloses a
parsing out of the natural and the social in simple causal terms.
4. Measuring global justice
The arguments in this paper so far have been concerned with what sorts of inequalities might
legitimately generate compensation complaints under just institutional schema envisioned by two
prominent liberal views: Rawlsian resourcism and the capabilities approach. What I have tried to
show is that, despite what resourcists claim, capability theorists are not committed to the view
that the distribution of natural endowments is just or unjust. Rather, at least some inequalities
197
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that resourcists take to view as purely natural are actually caused by socially controllable forms of
social organization, and this becomes clear once the appropriate model of disability—the
interaction model—is recognized.
In this final section, I move away from questions about legitimate compensation claims to
another important implication for a theory’s metric of justice, namely, issues pertaining to how
we ought to make comparative judgments about well-being, poverty, and inequality within a
global context. This practical concern of poverty and general welfare measurements in the service
for comparative evaluative judgements between countries and/or regions of the world is, of
course, distinct from the more theoretical questions that animate the debate between which
inequalities are legitimate candidates for rectification or justification in a just institutional order.
Nonetheless, to the extent that evaluative metrics are indeed informed by overarching
notions of justice, the two questions are linked.199 The arguments in this paper so far shed some
light on the connection. Specifically, what becomes clear in light of the arguments in this paper so
far is that the importance of the choice between a resourcist metric (insensitive to individual
difference) and a capability theory metric (sensitive to individual difference) turns, in large part,
on the distribution of disability across the globe. If disability is randomly distributed, that is, the
“rate” of disability is generally constant per capita, then the choice in metric will not make much
of a difference in terms of measuring underlying poverty or welfare levels. Randomly distributed
disability will be measured indirectly through its effects on the distribution and consumption of
social primary goods under the resourcist metric, and it will be measured somewhat more directly
in terms of its causal effects on the freedoms or functionings persons are able to enjoy (or not)
under the capability theorist metric. Even with a difference in the direct and indirect
measurement, the overall comparative evaluation between countries would be the same.
The problem, of course, is that there is no reason to think that disability will in fact be
randomly distributed across the globe. Rather, in light of the interaction model of disability, we
would expect there to be a non-random distribution of disability given that disability is, at least in
many of the cases we are interested in, directly related to how underlying “natural” impairments
interact with social organization. Non-random distribution is expected because it is a near truism
in development economics and other nearby social sciences that the highly disparate development
outcomes observed between countries is largely a function of the variation in the relevant
institutions between those countries. Formal and (as I have argued both in Chapter 1 and
elsewhere) informal institutions vary tremendously between different countries, and some
institutions are better than others producing welfare-relevant desirable outcomes.200 This point
is made a fortiori by looking toward “natural experiments” where institutional variation is
present but demographic and environmental variables are held constant. Think about the
difference in expected welfare outcomes for residents of Juarez and El Paso, or Nogales and
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Tucson, cities that fall on either side of the border between the United States and Mexico, for
example. The residents of Juarez and Nogales do worse on every welfare relevant metric
compared to the residents of Tucson and El Paso, who are but a few miles away from them
separated by an international border and living under an entirely different set of institutions that
the border reflects.
The interaction model gives us the theoretical resources to understand how macro- and
meso-level formal and informal institutions interact with underlying natural traits and
dispositions to produce development relevant outcomes, much in the way that macro-level
comparisons of political institutions are often taken to be the explanatorily decisive factor in
determining economic outcomes in standard development practice. Note, also, that the capability
theorist’s metric remains sensitive to non-random distribution of disability in way that helps us
make comparative evaluative judgments across countries even if the underlying distribution of
natural traits or dispositions (impairments) is randomly distributed. Non-random distribution of
disability and random distribution of impairment are entirely compatible on this view, for
impairment is recognized as a necessary but not sufficient condition for disability. The capability
theorist’s measurement metric will therefore be able to make micro-comparisons of effects of the
effects disability has on key functionings in a way that is only indirectly measured by the
resourcist approach, even on the more sophisticated versions of that approach.201
5. Conclusion
In §2a, I outlined resourcism and the capabilities approach, paying special attention to the the
wide agreement between the two approaches in their more sophisticated forms. In §2b, I aimed to
expose the precise point of divergence between the views, namely, with respect to the distribution
of natural endowments (and the natural inequalities they may give rise to). In §2c, I formulated
and explicated the resourcist’s central critique of the capability theorist’s metric: the
compensation for natural inequalities critique. In §3a, I argued that the capability theorist can
adopt the interaction model of disability, a strategy that largely deflates the resourcist critique. In
§3b, I related the underlying characteristics of the interaction model, namely, its focus on the
interaction between putatively natural traits and their environment, to broader understandings of
the role that formal and informal institutions play in development outcomes. I paid special
attention to the problem of gender in this subsection. In §4 I moved from a focus on what kinds of
inequalities might trigger compensation claims under the two respective views to how their
respective metrics fare with respect to comparative evaluative judgments of welfare-relevant
outcomes across countries.
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APPENDIX 1. Methodology (measuring informal
institutions)
The empirical findings in this dissertation are based on a specialized social norms survey, ‘Local
Understandings, Experiences and Expectations Survey’ developed by the Chatham House Africa
Programme and the University of Pennsylvania’s Social Norms Group (PennSONG). Survey
administration was carried out in 2018 with Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) as well
academics and practitioners from around the country. 5,600 surveys were carried out across
urban and rural areas in Adamawa, Benue, Enugu, Lagos, Rivers, Sokoto, and the Federal Capital
Territory of Abuja (FCT).
The survey instrument asked about five behaviours: power sector corruption,
examination malpractice, vote selling, and embezzlement. The survey was designed to uncover
underlying beliefs that drive corrupt practices. Using the theoretical resources from Bicchieri’s
(2006; 2016) definition of social norms, the survey asked the following questions:
1.

Behaviour – what did you do? How many times do you think it happened?

2. Prudential – what are the practical reasons for engaging or not engaging in a
practice?
3. Empirical expectations – what do you think other people do in the relevant
situation?
4. Normative expectations – what do you think other people think you should do in
the relevant situation?
5. Personal normative belief – what do think about a particular practice (in a moral
evaluative sense)?
6. Legal knowledge – do you think this practice is illegal?
The survey instrument was designed to measure the beliefs and expectations that accompany
voter markets in seven states across the country: Adamawa, Benue, Enugu, Lagos, Rivers, Sokoto,
and FCT-Abuja.
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(a) What kind of beliefs did we measure?
(i)

Personal normative beliefs

What are personal normative beliefs?
Personal normative beliefs are beliefs individuals hold about what people should do. There are
two different types of personal normative beliefs: (1) prudential personal normative beliefs, which
are beliefs about what one should do that appeal to a purely practical or instrumental reasons;
and (2) non-prudential personal normative beliefs, which are beliefs about what one should do
that appeal to non-practical or non-instrumental reasons, such as moral or religious reasons.
Measuring personal normative beliefs can be complicated because many languages have terms
that denote normativity but are ambiguous as to the type of normativity denoted. In English,
“should” operates in this way. Consider the following examples:
(1) I believe I should sell their votes because
a.

Prudential: I don’t trust the politician to deliver on campaign promises so I will take
what I can get.

b. Non-prudential: The politician is from my district, and if he offers something to
secure my support, it is my obligation to give it.
(2) I believe that people should not sell their votes because
a.

Prudential: Taking money from one political party will invite violence from another
political party.

b. Non-prudential: Each vote sold is a private benefit at the expense of a social cost. We
have obligations to each other to avoid acting selfishly in order sustain fair political
institutions.
Distinguishing between prudential and non-prudential beliefs is crucial because intervention
strategies for beliefs that are sustained by prudential beliefs will differ from those sustained by
non-prudential beliefs. For example, prudential beliefs may be responsive to empirical evidence;
moral or religious beliefs, especially deeply held ones, are not. This is why information campaigns
aimed at exposing the false prudential beliefs might be effective if the target behaviour is driven
by false prudential beliefs.
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How did we measure personal normative beliefs?
To measure personal normative beliefs with respect to vote markets, respondents were asked “Do
you think that people should collect money for a gift or a vote?” and “Do you think that it is
acceptable that people should collect money or a gift for a vote?” Depending on their answers to
these questions, they were then asked why they thought people should/should not collect money
for a gift or a vote and why it was acceptable/not acceptable to collect money for a gift of a vote.
The responses to these questions were then coded by the survey administrator as prudential, nonprudential, or other.
(ii)

Empirical expectations

What are empirical expectations?
Empirical expectations are beliefs about what others – typically a relevant reference network – do
with respect a particular behaviour. “I believe that 8 out of 10 people in my community exchanged
their vote for a money or a gift in the last election” is an example of an empirical expectation.
Empirical expectations might sometimes be taken as an imperfect proxy for the frequency
of a particular behaviour, especially in cases where direct questioning will likely lead to social
desirability bias in response. “How many people in your community do you think sold their vote?”
is more likely to elicit a truthful response relative to “Did you sell your vote?”
How did we measure empirical expectations?
To measure empirical expectations with respect to vote markets, respondents were asked “Think
about the people in your community, such as your friends, family, neighbours, and colleagues.
Out of 10 people in your community who voted in the last election, how many of them do you
think collected money or a gift for their vote?”
(iii)

Normative expectations

What are normative expectations?
Normative expectations are beliefs about the personal normative beliefs of other people. Since
personal normative beliefs might be either prudential or non-prudential, an individual’s
normative expectations may be composed of prudential or non-prudential beliefs. Consider the
following examples:
(1) I believe other people believe that individuals should sell their votes because
a.

Prudential: They don’t trust the politician to deliver on campaign promises so
they should take what they can get.

b. Non-prudential: The politician is from our district, and if he offers something to
secure our support, it is our obligation to give it.

79
Violations of normative expectations that are composed of non-prudential normative beliefs will
typically illicit sanctions. This is because expectations driven by non-prudential normative beliefs
suggest a shared rule within a community (typically a moral or religious rule). However, widely
shared prudential beliefs do not suggest a shared rule within a community. Rather, a community
may come to hold the same set of prudential beliefs because they have access to the same relevant
information and interpret it in the same way.
Note that individuals need not hold the normative beliefs that compose their normative
expectations. Normative beliefs may thus be inconsistent. A community is said to be suffering
from pluralistic ignorance when there is widespread mutual inconsistency in normative
expectations, e.g., when most individuals in the community share the same personal normative
beliefs but believe that others do not.
How did we measure normative expectations?
To measure personal normative beliefs, respondents were asked “Think about the people in your
community, such as your friends, family, neighbors, and colleagues. Out of 10 people in your
community who voted in the last election, how many of them do you think said that it is
acceptable to collect money or a gift for their vote?”
What kind of collective behaviors do these beliefs contribute to?
Measuring personal normative beliefs, empirical expectations, and normative expectations is key
to understanding the following collective behaviors:
Moral rules
If a collective practice is sustained by a moral rule, individuals usually have a socially
unconditional preference to follow the rule because of non-prudential personal normative
beliefs. For example, a devout Muslim would not eat pork even if they lived in a society where the
consumption of pork was widespread.
Shared prudential norms
If a collective practice is a shared prudential norm, individuals usually have a socially
unconditional preference to follow the rule because of prudential personal normative beliefs. For
example, the frequency of smoking cigarettes may be low in a number of communities because
each individual holds prudential beliefs about the health-related risks posed by cigarette smoke.
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Descriptive norms
If a collective practice is a descriptive norm, individuals usually have a socially conditional
preference to follow the rule based on their empirical expectations. Descriptive norms are
typically solutions to coordination problems. For example, individuals will generally drive on a
certain side of the road because others drive on that side of the road.
Social norms
If a collective practice is a social norm, individuals usually have a socially conditional preference
to follow the rule based on both their empirical and normative expectations. For example,
individuals in the United States will usually tip after a meal in a restaurant because they expect
other individuals to do so and because they expect others to expect them to do so.
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